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ABSTRACT
Civil-Military Relations: A Case Study
of Pakistan
by
Najiyah Khan
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Pakistan is a young and violent nation. It has been under military rule for
more than half of its existence and the presence of Islamists in the country has
been increasing in recent years. These two actors have played a crucial role in
creating the Pakistan of today: a violent, unstable system with revolving
governments. What role have civilian governments played while interacting with
the Islamists and the ever present military? What has led to the Pakistan we see
today? Is there any hope that Pakistan can remove the violent actors within its
borders and create real change to become a stable nation?
This thesis will attempt to analyze the three main actors in Pakistan: the
civilian government, the military, and the Islamists. It will discuss how the
relationship between these three has been alternatively cooperative and
antagonistic.
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INTRODUCTION
Pakistan has been through a tumultuous sixty years since independence.
The military played a pivotal role in the independence of Pakistan and has
continued its political role ever since. While the military’s role permeates
throughout the political system, there have been periods of challenges to this role
over the years. In recent years, particularly since the war on terror was
undertaken by President Musharraf, the military is being challenged by the
Islamists who employ Islam as an instrument for achieving their political
objectives.
Why is the military so dominant in Pakistan? How has the war on terror
shaped the new dimensions of the civil-military relations in Pakistan? How do the
democratic forces, secular and Islamist, deal with the changing policies of the
military political leaders? How will the current efforts at democratization change
the civil-military relations in the future? What will be the future of Islamism in
Pakistan? These are the critical questions that will be dealt with in this thesis.
Despite tremendous efforts on the part of the secular and religious forces,
and the creation of many civil institutions, there is no effective institutional
counterbalance to the military. In fact, some military leaders are effectively linked
to the civil society and have co-opted these forces to their own interests. General
Zia-al-Haq’s Islamization process (1977-1988) and support for the Islamists
empowered such groups, which the military regime manipulated in its own
domestic and foreign policies. The events of September 11 changed the
dynamics of the military-Islamists relationship, creating a war at home. It is in this
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context of internal war that the future of Pakistani democracy must be understood
and analyzed.
Many factors have played a role in creating the Pakistan of today. One must
begin by going back to the time before independence to understand the kind of
foundation Pakistan was built upon. The violent split of the Indian Subcontinent
put Pakistan on a unique path towards self-governance and greatly influenced
the direction that it has taken.
Pakistan and India were divided in 1947 after less than one-hundred years as
a British colony (also known as the British Raj). Pakistan was created for the
Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent and the Hindus were to remain in India. The
“partition”, as it is known to Indians and Pakistanis, was vicious and brutal. The
migration of approximately ten to twelve million people is considered to be the
largest of its kind in modern times.1 The number of deaths during the actual
migration between August and September of 1947 vary between 200,000 to one
million people.
The partition left a legacy that has been felt more so in Pakistan than in India.
Pakistan had to create a country from scratch. Infrastructure, institutions, and
governmental systems did not exist in Pakistan. India, on the other hand, had
many of these in place during the time of the British Raj. The British had
established institutions in India, which were utilized after partition to set up the
Indian government. Pakistan had no one but the military to turn to for assistance

1
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in creating some sort of government system. No outside organization or nation
was concerned about its feeble existence. With the weak and fragile Pakistan
still recovering from the devastation of partition, the military was able to come in
and take hold of the country from the beginning.
Pakistan’s beginnings and current standing in the world offer an interesting
study on relations between a dominant military and an almost non-existent civil
society. Chapter one of this thesis will introduce a theoretical framework
analyzing civil-military relations. It will discuss how the strength of civil
institutions can dictate and decide what kind of influence, if any, the military will
have in state affairs. Samuel Huntington’s theories on civil-military relations will
be discussed; specifically, his ideas regarding objective civilian control.
Chapter two will discuss the establishment of the state after partition. The
history behind the political development and the stages of both nation and state
building will be analyzed. Pakistan’s nation building mainly revolved around
religious identity, it was the reason for partition was to have a separate nation for
Muslims. The discussion about state building process will underscore the
attempts at creating a government system. This will include the first constitution,
written in 1956, and the role of Islam.
Chapter three will focus on the history and the continuing military influence in
Pakistani politics. Pakistan has seen direct military rule for more than half of its
sixty years of independence. The military leaders who have chosen to step in to
the leadership role have done so with the intention or claim of saving Pakistan
from self-destruction. No mention is made of the threat the military feels to its

viii

own existence and power. Numerous military leaders will be discussed in this
chapter, as well as the methods used to protect their power. The military has
and will use almost any means necessary to protect its own interests; this
includes using the Islamists.
Chapter four examines the significant role of the Islamists in Pakistani politics
from inception to the present. Islamists are defined as individuals or groups that
use Islam as a platform and inspiration for their political ideology and goals. In
Pakistan, many but not all Islamists use political parties to further their agenda.
They have, at times, aligned themselves with the military for this purpose and this
partnership has been volatile. Both players use each other to protect their own
interests. The influence of the Islamists has grown tremendously in the past
thirty years and more so since the events of September 11, 2001.
Chapter five will analyze attempts at the democratization of Pakistan and the
vital role the civil-military relationship has played in this struggle. I will include a
detailed analysis of the civilian leaders and their power play with the military.
With the numerous obstacles Pakistan has had to face, how can it move forward
and become a stable and healthy nation? It demands a relationship between the
civil society and military that gives power to the civilian institutions. Pakistan has
a long road ahead to meet this challenge. Will the military and the Islamists be
willing to step back and allow the civil institutions to have the main role in
Pakistani politics? The hope is that Pakistan has the ability to survive the internal
wars it is currently facing and move forward in becoming a stable democracy.
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CHAPTER 1
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Throughout history, numerous countries have experienced their military’s
involvement in the governmental system. Some have evolved into civilian
governments whereas others have experienced a vicious cycle of regular military
intrusion. Pakistan is one country that has witnessed a military presence in its
governmental system since its birth. In its nearly sixty-two years since
independence, the Pakistani military has had either direct or indirect control of
the government. It has had a tremendous influence on the direction that
Pakistan has taken. The current instability witnessed today in Pakistan is due to
an unbalanced relationship between the civil system and the military
establishment. What is greatly lacking is a civil-military relationship that allows
for the civil institutions to flourish and the military to stand in the background of
this civil environment.
Samuel Huntington is well known for his research in civil-military relations.
He breaks down the various levels of relationships that can exist between a
country’s military and civil system. He and other political scientists argue that to
eliminate the possibility of the military’s encroachment into governmental affairs,
civil supremacy must be present. The question that must be asked is what types
of civilian systems create an easy entry for the military and allows them to
flourish? In addition to Samuel Huntington, both Max Weber, and Christopher
Clapham contribute to this part of the discussion.

1

The backbone of a strong, well-established political system is a high level of
political institutionalization. Samuel Huntington contends that there are four
features that measure the institutionalization of a political system. They are:
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. When these four are in sync,
the political system, civil society, military, and other institutions work together to
create civil supremacy.
Gabriel Almond and C. Bingham Powell also contribute to the study of civil
institutions (civil supremacy) by describing two ways to gauge the amount of civil
supremacy that exists in a given civil society. They use sub-system autonomy
and structural differentiation to measure the level of institutionalism.
Weak civil institutions allow easy entry for domineering governing systems,
such as: patriarchy, patrimonialism, and neo-patrimonialism. These systems are
exhibited effectively by the military establishment. These systems and how they
allow for a strong military presence in the civil government will be explained in
greater detail in this chapter.
Civil Institutions
Samuel Huntington defines institutionalization as a “process by which
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”2

He argues that a

major distinction between a politically developed system and an underdeveloped
one is the numbers, size, and effectiveness of its organizations.3 He describes
four features of institutionalism that exist in societies and how these will dictate
2
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the type of society that exists in certain countries. The first feature is the
adaptability-rigidity of an organization in a society. The more adaptable it is the
more likely it is to survive over time. The “generational age” of an organization is
one approach to measure its adaptability. If an organization is still being led by
its founders its ability to adapt in the future becomes less likely. A successful
transfer of power over the lifetime of an organization is very important in creating
longevity. The second feature of institutionalism is the amount of complexity or
simplicity in an organization. If it is a highly complex organization it is considered
highly institutionalized. Huntington gives an example of the United States as a
hierarchy that exemplifies a high level of institutionalism. It has numerous
political institutions which serve many functions, they include: the presidency,
congress, the Supreme Court, and state governments which all serve different
purposes.4 The third feature of institutionalism is the amount of autonomy or
subordination that exists within an institution. This feature measures how much
independence an organization has from non-political actors, such as the military.
Are organizations easily influenced by the behavior of these non-political actors
or are they immune to their influence? In highly institutionalized and well
developed societies, the political organization is highly autonomous. While in
societies which lack autonomy, political organizations are extremely susceptible
to outside actors. The fourth feature of institutionalism is the level of coherence
or disunity in a society. According to Huntington, the ability to coordinate and

4
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discipline (signs of coherence) is crucial to politics, and political systems that
have successfully exhibited these behaviors have been highly institutionalized.
When these four features of institutionalism exist in a civil society the ability of
outside entities to influence it is less likely. This is largely due to the ability of the
civil institutions to provide for the society. The civilian society is satisfied that the
civil institutions can and will provide all that they need to succeed. The loyalty of
the populace to these institutions prevents the entrance of outside actors.
Related to the above discussion on levels of institutionalism are Huntington’s
two approaches to minimizing military power. These will offer a glimpse at the
different levels of involvement by the military in societies. In subjective civilian
control, one organization in civil society is able to maximize its power over all
other civil institutions. But there can be a fight for civilian control amongst the
civil groups. The military is manipulated by the domineering civil group which
wants to protect its own interests (i.e. maintaining power over all other civil
institutions). Because the military plays this function, it is unable to be seen as
an independent entity, which is crucial to a healthy, well-established civil society.
Conversely, in objective civilian control, military professionalism is of the utmost
importance. By maximizing the professionalism of the military, the civil society
makes them a tool of the state. They become a separate, autonomous entity; the
military operates independent of the civil society. Huntington argues that by
“making the military professional the state makes them politically sterile and
neutral.”5 Therefore, they know their place and the role they serve in society.
5
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Huntington contends that objective civilian control is difficult to create; hardly any
non-western nations have been successful in creating complete objective civilian
control.
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell discuss sub-system autonomy and
structural differentiation in civil societies and how they can dictate the amount of
institutionalism that exists. They add to Huntington’s argument regarding what
contributes to civil supremacy (i.e. strong civil institutions). Sub-systems, such
as political parties, pressure groups, and the mass media ought to be
independent of the government. Almond and Powell define sub-system
autonomy as the amount of independence these actors have from the
governmental structure. In weak civil societies these actors will be subordinate
to the government (ignoring the will of the populace), whereas in a strong civil
system, these actors are allowed autonomy to process political demands and
proposals.6 When these actors are subordinate to the government, other outside
actors are able to easily infiltrate the government and use their own power to
further their own interests.
Almond and Powell define structural differentiation as the development of new
roles and subsystems; it also deals with the changes that can occur in the
relationship between roles, structures, or between subsystems. Structural
differentiation is a principal aspect of development or transformation of a political
system.7 Almond and Powell use the United States as an example of a highly
6
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differentiated political system, “political functions are to be performed by multiple
highly specialized structures: communication is controlled by the mass media;
political recruitment is done by the electoral and party structures; interest
articulation, by a large variety of groups.”8
Subsystem autonomy and structural differentiation are somewhat interdependent. Almond and Powell claim that subsystem autonomy exists alongside
structural differentiation.”9 They argue that these two aspects of political
development are critical to the health of a government system. Subsystem
autonomy and structural differentiation can dictate the level of institutionalization
that is able to exist free and independent of the government system.
The theories of Huntington, Almond and Powell are connected by the
argument that describes the requirements of strong civil institutions and how they
lead to a healthier government system which is immune to non-governmental
actors.
The Military Establishment
Huntington’s research on civil-military relationships opens the door to a
collection of theories that discuss praetorianism, patriarchy, patrimonialism and
neo-patrimonialism. These theories explain the mindset of a military that feels
entitled to entering the political realm.
Huntington contends that praetorianism is a key component in a weak civil
society-strong military relationship. He defines praetorianism as the military’s
8

Ibid., p.31

9
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interference in their country’s political system10 “A praetorian society is one in
which there are no effective institutions, and in which social groups take direct
political action to achieve their goals - a free-for-all in which the army is likely to
be most successful because it largely controls the instruments of force.”11
Huntington continues by adding, “the military’s presence is due to the absence of
effective political institutions that are capable of mediating, refining, and
moderating group political action…this absence means that power is fragmented:
it comes in many forms and in small quantities. Authority over the system is
transitory, and the weakness of political institutions means that authority and
office are easily acquired and easily lost.”12 He discusses how in countries which
are not fully developed, the military has the opportunity to help build the society.
The key is that they realize their presence in civil society can prevent or stunt the
growth of political institutions and the economy. The military must acknowledge
that they can leave the praetorian environment only if they use the political
system to do so.13 This is an idealist view of military behavior. If the power that
comes with leadership does not consume them perhaps they will do what is right
and help their country create strong institutions and therefore build a healthier
civil-military relationship.

10
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Talukder Maniruzzaman also discusses the weakness of a military
government. He describes how military politicians are unable to establish
political organizations or effective political institutions. “Military skills do not
transfer well to the sphere of politics. Society is more complex than an army…”14
He argues that when creating political institutions, it is necessary that the leaders
of a nation have the political skills that go beyond the functional specialization
which is how the military trains its personnel. These political skills are earned
through years of service in the public sector.15
He goes on to discuss how the ongoing military interventions create a cycle of
underdeveloped political systems. How can the civil society break this vicious
cycle and make an attempt at establishing strong civil institutions?
Maniruzzaman cites Samuel Huntington when he discusses that the key factor in
political development is the growth of durable political institutions.16 Samuel
Finer adds to this discussion on the political weaknesses of the military. He
addresses two weaknesses: the first is their inability to properly run any society
that is not at its most primitive stage and the second weakness is their lack of
legitimacy.17
In developing societies, the military has an easier time administrating the
government. The military system usually includes systems of provisioning,

14
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supply, engineering, communications and education. This could be enough to
run a developing nation state. Whereas, in more advanced nations, the basic
technical skills of the military no longer match up to the demands of a growing
nation. In these nations, the economy and institutions are much more advanced;
this leads to the military mismanaging the nation due to its inexperience in this
area. These institutions need to be administered by experienced political leaders.
Finer contends that the second political weakness of the military is the
absence of legitimacy.
“Rule by force alone, or the threat of such force, is inadequate; in
addition, government must possess authority. It must be widely
recognized not only as the government but as the lawful, rightful
government. A government that based its rule on the fact that it
was materially stronger than any other force or forces in society
would prove both short lived and ineffective.”18
A military may attempt to legitimize itself by claiming to prepare the nation for an
incoming civilian government (i.e. elections). Finer quotes J. Rousseau to
summarize the importance of gaining authority, “the strongest is never strong
enough to be always the master unless he transforms might into right and
obedience into duty.”19 Unless the military makes attempts at legitimizing its
presence in government its time in power may will become short lived.
Finer also discusses different types of military regimes. He defines them as,
“a set of techniques used by the military to carry out their policies rather than as

18
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political or constitutional structures.”20 He outlines three different kinds of
regimes. The first is “indirect rule.” A civilian government is still in control;
however, the military blackmails the civilian government or removes one civilian
government for another. The second kind of military regime is dual rule. This
regime has both military and civilian rule; Finer states that it can take on the
qualities of an indirect rule or direct rule. The last type of military regime is direct
rule. In this system the army has removed the civilian government and taken
complete control of the country. These different regimes describe the degrees of
intervention by the military and therefore how involved they become in the
government.
Max Weber defines patriarchy as the paternal rule of a household. He
considers it the pure type of traditional domination.21 This term deals with the
household whereas patrimonialism expands its focus to include the rule of a
leader. Weber defines patrimonial government as “an extension of the ruler’s
household in which the relation between the ruler and his officials remain on the
basis of paternal authority.”22 It is usually found in feudal systems of government.
For Weber, both patrimonialism and feudalism are the two main types of
traditional domination. Almond and Powell contend that patrimonial systems
have a traditional political system with low subsystem autonomy. The low level

20
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of subsystem autonomy allows for easy entry by outside actors, in this case the
military.
Christopher Clapham suggests that neo-patrimonialism best describes the
characteristics of third world nations.23 He defines it as a form of organization in
which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and
administrative system...”24 It also goes beyond the confines of a household and
infiltrates the government. Bureaucrats hold offices in government organizations
and they practice government as a form of private property not public service.
They see the system as a way to advance their personal goals, even if they go
against the needs of the state. Neo-patrimonialism serves a valuable function of
maintaining a single legitimate source of authority. One individual makes all the
decisions and only his authority matters. Military leaders in a praetorian society
practice this single authority system. The general becomes the leader of the
military and of the civilian government. The leader in this system demonstrates
the relationship between himself and his underlings as one of personal
subordination. Delegating responsibilities can become problematic; these
leaders believe they have the right to intervene in any matter that comes under
their jurisdiction regardless of the chaos it could cause. This serves the valuable
function of maintaining a single legitimate source of authority. The sole leader
has control over every aspect of the governmental system. His understanding of

23
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the true purpose of serving in government is severely limited. They are unwilling
or unable to create a new (modern?) approach to governing.
Clapham describes the reasons why neo-patrimonialism is the most prevalent
type of authority in third world nations. “First, the natural human disinclination to
distinguish between one’s private and official self equally corresponds to the
normal forms of social organization in pre-colonial societies. Neopatrimonialism…also characterizes tribal societies in which one’s kin group is the
primary social value.”25 In a more global society, where common values are lost,
the need to connect at a personal level is even more desired. This, therefore,
reinforces neo-patrimonial tendencies in third world nations.
Clapham discusses how “neo-patrimonialism can consider straightforward
considerations of personal benefit and the exchange of favors that come to
replace the reciprocal obligations which characterize patrimonialism in its original
form.”26 He argues that this is apparent in the corruption prevalent in these types
of systems.
Huntington describes the absence of a civil-military relationship in
authoritarian regimes when compared to more industrialized democracies,
They lack the kind of civil-military relations characteristic of the world’s
industrial democracies which I once termed ‘objective civilian control’.
This involves: first, a high level of military professionalism and recognition
by the military officers of the limits of their professional competence;
second, the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political
leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; third,

25
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the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of
professional competence and autonomy for the military; and fourth, as a
result the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political
intervention in the military.27

When civil supremacy exists, a healthier government system usually follows.
In this environment, the military knows its place in the hierarchy. He argues that
these characteristics lead to civil supremacy. Neo-patrimonialism is common in
societies that have weak civil-military relations and weak institutions. This
weakness refers to a system where most likely the civil government is weaker
than the military and is therefore dominated by the military establishment. This
also allows ease of entry for the military into the political environment. Hence, a
praetorian society now exists.
Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
These theories can be applied to third world nations with strong military
establishments. Many of these nations exhibit numerous aspects of the theories
discussed in this chapter. Since its independence, Pakistan has been a victim of
an all too powerful military. The military has played a role in the political system
since its inception in 1947. One of the main issues at play in Pakistan is the lack
of civil supremacy. As has been explained in this chapter, the lack of established
institutions allows for the military’s entry into the civil society. The case study of
Pakistan illustrates how military rule introduces a cycle of underdevelopment of
institutions and government systems. The military prevents the country from
maturing into a strong political system. Some of the authors discussed in this
27
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chapter describe the weaknesses of military governments and those weaknesses
have been witnessed in Pakistan during its sixty years of existence.
Can Pakistan find a healthy balance between its civil and military institutions?
First, civil supremacy must be established, this will be the cornerstone of a strong
political system. Will the military allow Pakistan to take this first step towards the
creation of a country that will no longer need to rely so heavily on its military
establishment? As this thesis will discuss in further detail in the following
chapters, there are many actors responsible for the current state of affairs in
Pakistan.

14

CHAPTER 2
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF PAKISTAN
Colonialism
The “British Raj” occupied the Indian Subcontinent for nearly one-hundred
years (1858-1947). However, Britain had been in this region for quite some time
before establishing a colony. The East India Company, a British trading
company, exchanged valuable goods on the subcontinent for a hundred years
before making it a colony in 1858.
Many researchers have discussed the divide and rule practice of the British
as a strategy to keep the Indian population (both Hindus and Muslims) under
control. During the occupation by the East India Company, revolts broke out
amongst the civilian population. The British responded by aligning the people by
religion and castes. They understood that dividing the population by religion and
caste would create a weak populace; therefore, preventing or limiting the
chances of future uprisings. “To preserve British power, officials encouraged
minority constituencies to define themselves in opposition to one another, as
Muslims against Hindus…”28
This practice of divide and conquer by the British greatly contributed and
influenced to the communal tensions on the Indian Subcontinent seen then and
now. It played a role in creating the violent atmosphere of the partition. It was
also a factor in the 1971 war with India, which resulted in the secession of East
Pakistan.
28
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Partition of the Indian Subcontinent
The decolonization of the British Empire occurred after World War II. The war
had ravaged England and the financial strain of their vast empire was difficult to
maintain. As the British turned to rebuilding their own country, there was a new
opportunity for Indian sub-continent decolonization. During this time, numerous
violent outbreaks were occurring in their largest colony. The British Empire
wanted to make a quick exit from the escalating riots on the Indian Subcontinent.
Two organizations within the Subcontinent emerged in the early 1900s and
they eventually became national players in the fight for independence. They
were the All-India Muslim League and the Congress Party (a majority of its
members were Hindus). The Muslim League was created in 1906 by an elite
group of Muslims who witnessed the marginalization of the Muslim populace at
the hands of the Hindu majority. Aga Khan, the leader of the Ismaili (a sect of
Muslims) community in Bombay led this delegation; he was also one of the
richest Indians on the Subcontinent. Upcoming elections regarding new British
constitutional changes brought upon a strong desire to have a separate Muslim
entity that would be able to fairly represent the political rights of Muslims on the
Indian Subcontinent. This elite group of Muslims brought their concerns to the
Viceroy of the British Colony, Lord Minto. They declared that a separate Muslim
electorate must be created before the elections on the constitutional reforms.
They argued that non-Muslim candidates and/or elected officials would not
represent the needs of Muslims but rather the needs of the Hindu majority. This
opportunity to further split the two religions was ideal for the strategy of the

16

British rulers. They believed that splitting the two largest groups on the
Subcontinent would solidify the power of British rule. According to historian
Judith Walsh, numerous scholars believe that this 1906 decision to allow a
separate Muslim party to go against the Congress party was the beginning of the
British practice of “divide and rule.”29 Months after the meeting with Lord Minto,
this group of Muslims created the All-India Muslim League. The organization
was to be exclusively Muslim, and the purpose of the League, officially, was to
advance the political rights of Muslims.30
At the time of independence, the Muslim League was led by Muhammad Ali
Jinnah. He is considered the “Father of Pakistan” and was known as a man of
great integrity and charisma. His natural leadership skills were tested time and
time again during the arduous process of independence. He earned his law
degree in England and returned soon afterwards to Bombay where he began a
successful law practice.31 He began working with the Muslim League in 1913.
Shortly after joining, Jinnah realized that Muslims and Hindus would not be able
to survive together as a united nation. He believed the Hindu majority would
always drown out the Muslim voices and he, therefore, channeled his energy
towards an independent state for Muslims. Jinnah was not a religious man and
his vision for Pakistan was a secular nation. Even though the Muslim League
members did use Islam to ignite a desire among the Muslim populace, Jinnah
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had no intention of creating an Islamic state. His charismatic nature and ability to
inspire the masses earned him the title of Quaid I Azam (great leader) by the
people of Pakistan. Jinnah died one year after Pakistan’s independence, too
soon for the young nation.
Before partition, Jawaharlal Nehru as the leader of the Congress party
pushed for the independence of India from British Rule. He became the first
prime minister of India after partition. The Congress Party wanted an undivided,
independent India. The British involved in the debate sided with the Congress
Party over the Muslim League’s position for two separate independent countries:
one for Muslims and one for Hindus.
Lord Mountbatten, Britain’s last Viceroy to India, played a crucial role in the
independence of the Indian Subcontinent. He represented the British during
negotiations, acting as a mediator. Lord Mountbatten suggested that a date for
independence be chosen quickly, before any issues regarding the splitting of a
nation were decided (dividing up the army, allocating revenue sources, and other
related issues). This purposeful neglect would greatly affect Pakistan’s attempts
at establishing a state. In February, 1947, the negotiators chose June, 1948 as
the deadline for independence. “Lord Mountbatten…was to act as a midwife for
a new independent India, or more than one India if that proved inevitable. He
was to arrange things as well as he could for the birth. But if he could not
arrange things well, the baby was to be born regardless”.32 Pakistan would be
created for the Muslim majority areas. It would consist of West Pakistan, which
32
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was in the northwest region of the Indian subcontinent, and East Pakistan (which
would become Bangladesh in 1971), in the northeast. India, in between these
two areas, would be home to the large Hindu population.
The newly divided nations were completely unprepared for the massive
migration that would soon take place. Independence was declared on August 14,
1947 for Pakistan and India’s independence was the following day, August 15,
1947. Muslims in India began their journey to their new homeland of Pakistan
and Hindus in Pakistan began their trek to India. This exodus included
approximately twelve million people.33 Unfortunately this was a very violent and
bloody period of time that involved numerous atrocities. The animosity towards
different religions was augmented by a strong sense of nationalism and religious
identity. Being forced to give up everything they owned led many to express their
frustration in extremely violent ways.
Entire villages were destroyed and the inhabitants killed, women were
kidnapped, mutilated and raped, and entire trainloads of people traveling to their
new homeland were burned. These are only a few of the ways the horrendous
hostility was expressed.
“The violence was designed to eliminate and drive out the
opposing ethnic group while forging a new moral community.
For all the superhuman effort which had been invested in untangling
the two nations - their land, possessions and military stores – few
had turned their minds to the new nations’ most precious asset: their
people”.34
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After the bloody migrations had ended, the countries were left to pick up the
pieces of their tattered nations. They had to build their new homelands from the
bloodbath of independence and move forward. The number of deaths during the
months of August and September of 1947 range from 200,000 to one million. An
exact count will never be known, “…the machinery did not exist to keep an exact
tally of deaths, and in many cases the murder gangs buried their victims…at
least one million lost their lives.35 This was the tragic birth of these nations.
Along with other serious issues of development (economy, treasury, and a nonexistent government system) Pakistan had to deal with millions of refugees. The
numerous demands on the young nation would add to the stress of attempting to
create a stable, unified state.
The Creation of Pakistan
The leaders of Pakistan had to focus on nation and state building. The nation
building revolved around religious identity. The creation of Pakistan was
ultimately due to a desire to have a nation where Muslims would be fairly
represented.
While State building involved setting up a governmental system to run the
nation, the new system would most likely be parliamentary because that system
was in place before partition. During the British Raj a parliamentary system of
government was established on the Indian subcontinent. The British
implemented a government system much like their own parliamentary approach
35
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in many of their colonies. The influence of the British Empire is quite present in
the governments of both India and Pakistan today. This government style was
the only system the subcontinent had witnessed in recent times and it was
implemented in the two new nations.
Nation Building - Islam was used as a source of national identity in creating
Pakistan; a division between Muslims and Hindus. Before partition Jinnah came
to the conclusion that Muslims would never be fairly represented on the Indian
subcontinent. He fought for a separate nation with the hopes that it would
provide Muslims with a voice in the government. Jinnah, however, in a famous
speech given on August 11, 1947, to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in the
city of Karachi, specifically stated the intention to make Pakistan a secular nation.
“You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to
go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that
has nothing to do with the business of the state. . . .We are starting
this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens
of one state.”36

The use of Muslim identity to create Pakistan was quite strong and influential in
gaining support for its creation. The leaders of the Muslim League used religion
to instill a passion among the populace for a separate state for Muslims. The
timing was ideal; communal tensions amongst the Muslims and Hindus were at
its peak. The idea of a separate nation for Muslims became very appealing.
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These contradictions by Jinnah led to a shaky start for the nation. After
Jinnah’s death in October of 1948, the direction of the country was further
derailed by leaders who stepped in with their own agendas. What and how much
of a role would Islam play in the government was unknown.
State Building - Numerous issues arose after the Muslim migration to the new
country. The leaders of the Pakistan movement were more concerned with
creating a nation than with deciding the details of a Pakistan government. Jinnah
and others were so involved with fighting for the creation of a Muslim country that
anything beyond that never came to mind.
“There is nothing in the archives to even hint that someone was
responsible for defining the nature and structure of the state, its
purposes and functions, its powers and limitations …Pakistan, in
effect, was created without the guidance of an astute…savant who
might have given thought to the Muslim political experience and how
it combined with the conditions of the subcontinent to fabricate a
contemporary nation-state”37

Because creating a foundation was ignored by the first leaders of Pakistan, the
nation found itself haphazardly putting a government in place. The assumption
was that the Muslim League would step in after partition and begin building a
state system. However, this organization fell into disarray after partition. They
were founded on the ideal of overcoming Hindu domination. When
independence occurred, the Muslim League’s ideology was irrelevant. Without a
national party to unite the nation, regional parties entered the young political
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system. These parties reflect Pakistan’s cumulative social cleavage patterns.38
This issue has been a major factor in Pakistani politics since its independence.
The country is vastly diverse; many ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences
exist. These have and continue to cause great challenges to the government
structure. The government does not fairly represent all regions of the country
and this has led to long-lasting tensions which detract from creating a stable
governmental system.
Immediately after partition, the new nation was faced with many complicated
issues. Pakistan faced, “In its first year…an empty treasury, non-existent
economy, jerry-built governing structure, inundation of millions of desperate
people (refugees) and a war in Kashmir.”39
Jinnah chose to become the first Governor-General of Pakistan and also
assumed the position of the President of the Constituent Assembly. This was not
due to a desire for complete power, rather, “it was motivated by a desire to
underscore Pakistan’s sovereignty…”40 His intention was to protect Pakistan and
nurture it from its birth. However, some scholars argue that this move has set a
bad example for future leaders of Pakistan. Many of Pakistan’s leaders have
used these positions to increase their own power. Ian Talbot argues that
Jinnah’s reasons for assuming such power was to protect the young nation from
going under. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of future leaders.
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An established state would find it difficult to properly handle the many
problems Pakistan faced from birth. These issues along with trying to establish a
parliamentary system overwhelmed the first leaders of Pakistan. Their failure to
properly deal with these issues has much to do with their personal agendas.
After partition, The Government of India Act of 1935 was used as a temporary
constitution. This document was created during the British Rule and the leaders
of Pakistan used it until they could create their own constitution. However,
drafting a constitution for Pakistan was to be a long and arduous process.
Constitution Making - The establishment of a constitution is considered the
cornerstone of a new country’s foundation. However, Pakistan’s first constitution
was not completed until 1956, nine years after independence. This delay was
caused by the parliament’s reluctance to lose their power once the constitution
was ratified. The parliamentarians serving between independence and the mid
1950s had no experience, nor a sense of responsibility to serve the people of
Pakistan.41 CAP (Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan) members were expected
to implement a constitution for Pakistan. The lack of resources at the time of
partition prevented elections of any kind, so CAP was made up of men who
served in the provincial assemblies elected in 1946 during the British rule.42
These individuals served in numerous posts (at the city, state, and national level)
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at the same time and were seen as power hungry and void of integrity. They had
great difficulty in defining an Islamic state.
Overt Islamization of the government could be seen as a hindrance to a
stable government. After Jinnah’s death, the CAP members were unwilling to
find a healthy balance of Islam in the government system. The ulama (religious
leaders) that served in CAP were successful in their attempts to add in the
opening sentence to the Objectives Resolution (a precursor to a constitution) a
line that God alone has sovereignty over the universe.43 Thus, the first presence
of religion in the government documents took place. Jinnah’s dream of a secular
Pakistan had taken its first step away from his vision.
Islam and its role in the government are mentioned in four sections of the
1956 Constitution. The Preamble begins in the name of Allah (God). This
religious practice to begin with the “name of God, the most beneficent and most
merciful”, is common amongst Muslims. The Preamble goes on to state that
Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be a “democratic state based on Islamic principles.”44
The writers of the Constitution used Jinnah to explain the presence of Islam
within the document. The document states that Muslims would be free and able
to live their lives according to Islamic teachings. This section concludes by
stating the date of ratification of the constitution in first the Islamic calendar and
then the Gregorian calendar. From the first section of the 1956 Constitution,
Islam’s presence is prevalent.
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In Part I of the Constitution, titled The Republic and its Territories, the nation
is given the formal title of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.45 In later revisions to
the constitution, made by future leaders, this title was revised. Islam was
removed from the title and then added again, dependent upon the agenda of the
individual in power.
Part III, titled Directive Principles of State, discusses Islam’s role in relation to
government affairs in more detail. It begins by stating that Pakistan will create
ties with other Muslim nations. Also, measures will be taken to enable Pakistani
Muslims to live their lives by the teachings given in the Holy Quran and the
Sunnah (the way Prophet Muhammad lived his life). This section also intends to
offer institutions where Muslims will be able to learn about these teachings. The
nation will make it mandatory for Muslims to learn the Holy Quran. It will also
ensure that the collection of Zakat (charity collected from Muslims to be
distributed to the poor) is properly handled. In addition, the state will be
responsible for administering the affairs and the organization of mosques.46 In
Part III of the constitution it is quite apparent that the State intends to have
control over Islamic religious activities. The influence of religious leaders in the
creation of the 1956 Constitution is obvious.
The last section of the Constitution that mentions Islam is part 12, titled
General Provisions. Under “Islamic Provisions” the President of the country will
create an institution for Islamic research and teaching. This institution will assist
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in cementing a Muslim community based on Islamic principles.47 A special tax, to
be decided by the Parliament, may be applied to Muslims to aid in the financial
costs of this institution. In addition, any laws that are enacted by the state will not
contradict the teachings of Islam, nor will these laws violate the rights of nonMuslims.
The 1956 Constitution had numerous mentions of Islam and its role in
administering state affairs. This constitution would be revised many times in the
future. Whoever was leading the country at the time, civilian or military would
use the role of Islam in government affairs to their benefit. Some removed Islam
and some increased its role in state affairs. The role of Islam depended upon
that particular leader’s personal agenda. This usually involved around protecting
or increasing their power.
The role of Islam in Pakistan’s Constitution is much stronger than Jinnah
intended. The role of the maulas (religious leaders), the violent partition and the
tension with India, all created the desire and need for a Muslim identity. The
presence of Islam in the 1956 Constitution represents this desire.
Kashmir
Kashmir was a detrimental setback to the new country of Pakistan. From the
time of partition to the present, this area, located along the northern border
between Pakistan and India, has been a major point of contention; it led to the
first war between the two nations within a year of independence. “Thus from day
one, this conflict landed Pakistan in a security dilemma, and the military budget
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became a priority, indirectly increasing the strength and power of the military and
furthering the poverty of the country.”48 Before partition, the princely states (which
included Kashmir) were advised to align themselves with either Pakistan or India.
The decision was expected to be based on the majority religion in that region. In
Kashmir the majority of the population was Muslim. However, after immense
pressure from Indian forces, the Hindu leader of Kashmir chose to align with
India.

To the people of Pakistan, Kashmir is both a religious and political issue

that has not been resolved. They believe that because the majority of the
population is Muslim, Kashmir belongs to Pakistan. This contentious issue has
created deep lying animosity with India since Partition. It has also led to the
military’s enduring presence along the border of Kashmir.
The 1971 War
The 1971 War illustrates the inability of the West Pakistan leadership to
practice democracy. Since partition, East Pakistan (known as Bangladesh since
1971) had been ignored as West Pakistan made attempts to create a new nation.
East Pakistan had a larger population; however, the make-up of the citizenry was
of Bengali ethnicity. The West Pakistan leaders marginalized the Bengali
majority of East Pakistan by ignoring their right to fair representation in
parliament. It is ironic that this marginalization they directed towards fellow
Muslims is what had initially created a desire for a separate nation for Muslims.
These Bengalis were seen as lower class citizens because they were ethnically
different than West Pakistanis. The fact that both populations (West and East
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Pakistan) were Muslims was not enough for the West Pakistan government to
treat the Bengalis fairly.
In the 1970 parliamentary elections the East Pakistani political party received
the majority of seats, “Out of the 162 seats allotted for East Pakistan in the
National Assembly it won 160…”49 The leader of the party was Mujibur Rahman.
From West Pakistan, the PPP (the Pakistan’s People Party) led by Zulfikar
Bhutto won the second most seats in parliament. The Awami League had fairly
won the elections and expected to be the majority in the parliament. However,
the PPP and Bhutto were not ready to do so. Bhutto was willing to share the
power, as long as the PPP had the upper hand. Rahman was fed up with the
power politics of the Western part of the nation. West Pakistan had been
unwilling to hand over power because they felt the need to protect their own
interests before the interests of democracy and fairness.
East Pakistan believed that secession was the only option, but West Pakistan
was vehemently against the secession. For West Pakistan, losing land mass
and population would weaken Pakistan against India. The reason against the
secession of East Pakistan was based solely on the issue of national security.
During the year 1971, unsuccessful negotiations took place to share power
between the two political parties (the Awami League of East Pakistan and the
PPP of West Pakistan). The military took violent action during this time to
intimidate the Bengali population of East Pakistan. In March of 1971, they
conducted “Operation Searchlight”. The military attacked two residence halls at
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Dhaka University (in the largest city of East Pakistan), which resulted in deaths of
hundreds of their own citizens. Numerous attacks on other targets within the city
were an attempt to implement martial law in East Pakistan. The rebels in East
Pakistan were seen as traitors because they wanted to secede. This violent
attack remained unknown to most of the population of West Pakistan, due to a
media blackout ordered by the government.50 During this year of terror,
approximately seven million refugees fled across the border to India.
India used the refugee issue to get involved in the civil war. By supporting the
East Pakistanis India saw an opportunity to weaken and divide West Pakistan.
The leadership of used the involvement of India as an opportunity to use Islam to
galvanize their population for the war. By painting India as an instigator who was
attempting to split the Muslim nation, West Pakistan government legitimized the
cause of the war. They justified the large military presence in East Pakistan as a
fight for Islam against non-Muslims.

By late November 1971, India had lined up

troops along their shared border with East Pakistan. The war between India and
Pakistan lasted only two weeks. The Indian army was significantly more
powerful in numbers and artillery than the Pakistani army and the end came
quickly. The cease fire occurred on December 16, 1971, the same day
Bangladesh declared independence. 93,000 Pakistani POWs were captured by
the Indian army, further demoralizing a nation that just experienced a humiliating
civil war.
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This time in Pakistan was quite detrimental to its nation building. Being
ripped in half during a war with their more powerful neighbor further demoralized
a nation still trying to create a foundation for itself. This time period also
illustrates the power issues that the military and civilian governments in West
Pakistan were handled with immaturity and selfishness. The inability to share
power provoked a violent episode in the country’s history. The protection of
Islam and preserving the nation were the arguments used by the Pakistani
government time and time again to justify its actions regardless of how violent
and unethical they may have been.
The Role of Modernization in Pakistan Civil Society
The absence of modernization in this environment is related to the ideas
discussed earlier in this chapter and also in chapter one. To define
modernization political scientist Richard Chilcote quotes from the well-known
work The Politics of Modernization by David Apter, “Modernization implies three
conditions – a social system that can constantly innovate without falling apart…;
differentiated, flexible social structures; and a social framework to provide the
skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world.” 51
It can be argued that the lack of modernization in Pakistan allowed the military
and the Islamists to easily enter the civil system and establish control. The
increased lack of stability attributed to their presence greatly hinders Pakistan’s
future chances of advancing into a modern society
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The colonial legacy is visible in Pakistani politics today. The quick departure
of the British from the Indian Subcontinent prevented the healthy birth of Pakistan.
Trying to create a nation-state after the horrific partition was too much for the
young nation to handle. It has never fully recovered from that experience. The
role of Islam during this time was contradictory. The founders used Islam to
instill a passion in the populace but at the same time Jinnah desired a secular
nation. His dream died with him. If he had lived perhaps Pakistan would have
taken a different path. The government system that was put into effect after
independence was full of power hungry individuals who put off implementing a
proper constitution to protect their positions of power. Numerous constitutions
and revisions have come and gone in Pakistan politics, almost as quickly as the
civilian governments. The creation of a constitution soon after partition might
have led Pakistan on a different path, but it was prevented by the lack of
resources and the unstable environment caused by the violent split of the
Subcontinent.
From the beginning in 1947, the military used this weak civilian system to
enter the political foray with great success. Their personal vested interests in the
power of political office and the economic sector will be discussed in the following
chapter. The military’s use of Islam to further their own agenda is also prevalent
in the numerous military takeovers.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
History
The partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 required the British Indian
army and its resources to be divided between India and Pakistan. Because
neither India nor the British were enthusiastic about splitting the Indian
Subcontinent, the lack of support that Pakistan received upon independence is
not surprising. “Pakistan’s share of the Indian army came to roughly 36 percent
or approximately 140,000 out of a total strength of some 410,000 in 1947…The
stickiest issue was how to divide the surplus stores (firearms). Pakistan’s
representatives wanted joint administration of these stores. But New Delhi’s
representatives were not in the business of distributing firearms to enemies.”52
Due to the lack of support Pakistan received from England and India, it started off
as a country financially and militarily weak. India from the beginning had the
infrastructure and government system in place when the countries split in 1947.
Pakistan had to start from scratch, and to expect their new enemy to be fair in
splitting financial and military resources was highly unlikely. “If it was to survive
as an independent entity it had to create a new administrative structure for its
central government, resettle millions of refugees, build new provincial
governments in both western Punjab and eastern Bengal, …establish an
industrial infrastructure, modernize its defense forces and to do so without
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anything remotely resembling a financial machinery.”53 Pakistan’s top priority
was the defense of their new borders. They had serious threats to their security
from both Afghanistan and India. If Pakistan was to be perceived as weak and
unable to defend itself, it would fall apart as a nation very quickly.
Ideology
Upon independence the military’s main purpose was focused on national
security. It was considered the protector of Muslim Pakistan against neighboring
Hindu India. The military was the only entity that survived the split from India and
therefore was relied upon to create the foundation of Pakistan. National security
involved both the survival of the nation and of Islam. The military was the
protector of the country, but more importantly it was protecting Muslim Pakistan.
The religious overtones of its role prevented the military from being place in its
proper position in the government system. Since this was the foundation built by
the military over sixty years ago, it has been difficult to separate one from the
other. The military has become the protector of all that is important for Pakistan.
It has become entrenched in this ideology, and the military will therefore find it
quite challenging to break away and function solely as a subordinate organization
to the civilian government. “Since the military has acquired the role of the
guardian of the country’s sovereignty and overall security the organization tends
to view domestic political crises from the perspective of the external threat.”54
Since everything happening within the country can effect
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outside security threats, the military feels justified in getting involved in every
aspect of the internal functions of the state. By interfering in the internal structure
of the country the military is protecting the external threats that could jeopardize
the existence of Pakistan. This is the mentality of the military and can help
explain why it has and continues to play such a pivotal role in Pakistan politics.
Organization
The military of Pakistan consists of three branches: army, air force and navy.
“The military in Pakistan is a voluntary service, with 650,000 personnel. The
army has 550,000 personnel. This is followed by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
with 45,000 personnel and the Pakistan Navy (PN) with 25,000 workforce.”55
Due to its size, the army branch chief holds the most power. The large numbers
of the army also gives it more “institutional power” than the Air Force and Navy.
These three departments are organized in a hierarchy. The chiefs of the
services are the highest authority in this structure.
The organization of the military has allowed for the powerful army sector to
create an influential position for itself. It is without a doubt the most powerful of
the three departments. The numerous takeovers of the civilian government has
allowed for it to expand its influence and power over the other two branches.
The massive financial power of the Pakistan military is a crucial aspect of its
strong hold on Pakistan. It is able to operate freely without any consequences
because it holds such a grip on the nation. Ayesha Siddiqa defines Milbus, “as
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the military capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity,
especially the officer cadre, which is not recorded as the part of the defense
budget or does not follow the normal accountability procedures of the state…It is
either controlled by the military or under its implicit or explicit patronage.”56
The Inter-Services Intelligence Agency has become an intricate part of the
military’s operations; more so since the Afghanistan war in the 1980s. It has also
been linked with the Islamists and this relationship has been instrumental in
creating the Pakistan of today. The head of the ISI is appointed by the military
chief and reports only to him.
The ISI has been involved in numerous attempts to dislodge power from the
civilian government. One example is when they became involved in creating a
coalition of Islamists political parties to compete Benazir Bhutto’s PPP party in
the 1998 elections to prevent her from winning re-election. This example of
behind the scenes tactics by the ISI illustrates their strategy to protect their
interests. Including the volatile Islamists in this agenda created an unstable
alliance that has been a love/hate relationship since its inception.
The power of the ISI grew immensely during the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. “…a legacy of the conflict was the immense growth in the
ISI’s power which both shaped Afghan policy and funneled Western largesse to
the mujahideen.” 57 The numerous refugees that came into Pakistan during this
time period included the mujahideen (freedom fighters) which had been trained
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by the ISI to fight the Russians. With their presence in Pakistan, the ISI had
inherited a large, violent problem. These mujahideen focused on three issues:
increased sectarian violence, targeting western interests (mostly the United
States) and fighting against India for Kashmir.58
Ethnic Make-up
Pakistan is made-up of four provinces. Geographically, the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) represents the northwest region that borders
Afghanistan, sixteen percent of the population lives in this province.59 Below the
NWFP is Baluchistan, which is in the Southwestern part of the country. It also
borders Afghanistan to the west and meets the Arabian Sea to the South. This
province represents three percent of the Pakistani population.60 These two
provinces represent primarily tribal communities that date back generations.
They do not necessarily identify themselves as Pakistani first. Tribal identity is
more important. Pashtuns reside in the NWFP and they identify themselves as
such. During partition these tribes did not want to be a part of the newly formed
Pakistan. They preferred to be their own nation, however, the British ignored this
request and the lines of division were drawn without their input. They have been
forced to be a part of Pakistan.
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To the east of the NWFP is Sindh, which borders the Arabian Sea to the
South and India to its east. It represents seventeen percent of the population.61
This region also holds the majority of migrants that are called Mohajirs. These
people are defines as the immigrants who left India during the 1947 partition of
India and Pakistan. They mostly reside in the urban areas of the Sindh province.
Above the Sindh province is the Punjab. Over fifty percent of the population of
Pakistan resides here. It shares borders with the three aforementioned
provinces and also with India to the east and the disputed region of Kashmir to its
north. The Punjab was witness to the bloodiest violence during the partition. It
was split into two in 1947. The west portion lies in Pakistan and the eastern
portion lies in Western India.
The provinces represent people who are very much identified by their place of
origin. There are also language barriers to consider. Some of the provinces do
not claim Urdu (the most common language spoken in the country) as their first
language. This is another reason that creates a divide amongst Pakistanis. The
Punjabi language is considered the second most common language spoken in
Pakistan. If a Pakistani meets fellow Pakistani one of the first questions asked is
which province are they from. Immediately assumptions are made about them
after they are identified. Many of these people identify themselves more so with
their region than they do as a Pakistani.
The Pakistan military is made up primarily of individuals living in the Punjab
province. These Punjabis, an agrarian class, are well schooled in the military
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culture. “The deep and enduring roots which the military have sunk into
thousands of Punjabi villages may be the key to military dominance in
Pakistan.”62 They educate the children of the villages. Punjabis believe that
being a part of the military is an honor. It takes them out of the fields and offers
steady pay and pensions; families express great pride in knowing their children
are members of the military. The Punjabi majority in the military creates a bond
amongst the members, one that is difficult for an outsider to penetrate. It has
become an elitist organization. The preference for Punjabi recruits has lead to a
disgruntled populace outside of the Punjab province.
“Approximately 75 percent of the army is drawn from the Punjab province.
Another 20 percent are from districts in the NWFP. The other two
provinces, Baluchistan and Sindh, together have about a 5 percent share
of the personnel…this ethnic composition plays a major role in the
country’s politics, since it dovetails into the tense relationship between the
ethnic communities and centre-province relations.”63
The reasons for the military being a majority Punjabi goes back to the British
Raj. The 1857 Mutiny of the Bengal Army brought about changes in the make-up
of the army. “The British military…created the myth of the ‘martial races’ with
reference to the Punjabis, as part of their drive to restructure the armed
forces…The Punjabis were more willing to fight for the British in return for
material rewards and greater employment opportunities…As a result, the
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percentage of Punjabis in the military rose from 32.7 percent in 1858 to 53.7
percent in 1910.”64 The Pakistan military has successfully kept up this tradition.
Miltary in Politics
Two conflicts that took place in 1965 and the mid 1980s reflect the consistent
nature of the Pakistan military to become too involved in the political side of
Pakistan’s war strategies. The military ought to take orders from the civilian
leader. However, in the case of Pakistan, the political leaders during these wars
were both military generals. This immediately creates a conflict of interest and
the outcomes of these wars confirm this problem. Islamists thought became
more influential during the wars and these have contributed to the current
problems facing Pakistan.
The 1965 war – The war with India “linked Pakistan’s military closer to an
Islamist ideology. Religious symbolism and calls to Jihad were used to build the
morale of soldiers and the people.”65 The military men believed that the Bengalis
were brainwashed by Hindu India. With this mindset they justified the violent
atrocities against the Bengalis. “The traditional ulema and Islamists used the
environment of jihad to advance their own agenda, and one agenda item was
that they should be accepted as custodians of Pakistan’s ideology and identity.”66
However, General Ayub Khan had his own vision of Islam’s role in Pakistan. “He
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envisioned Islam as a nation-building tool, controlled by an enlightened military
leader rather than by clerics.”67 General Ayub felt he was the “enlightened
leader.” This is how Islam was used to further his own agenda. He used it to
further fuel the flames of hatred the Pakistanis felt for Hindu India; he felt this was
nation building. By painting the war as a fight for Islam’s existence on the Indian
Subcontinent, jihad was justified. The state controlled media also painted a
picture of successful Pakistani military conquests against India. This slanted
media coverage convinced the Pakistani population that their war against India
was a success. The opposite was true. Pakistan had occupied more enemy
land than India; however, India’s land was more strategically located. Ayub Khan
met with the Indian Prime Minister Lal Shastri in Tashkent (capital of Uzbekistan)
to discuss the details of swapping the land taken during the brief war. The public
was in an uproar. Due to the slanted media portrayals, they could not
understand why Khan was giving up so much to India if Pakistan had won the
war. After intense protests, he resigned as president in March 1969. “Instead of
transferring power to the speaker of the National Assembly, a Bengali, as
required by his own constitution of 1962, Ayub Khan returned the country to
martial law. The army chief, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, became
Pakistan’s president and chief martial law administrator and ruled by decree,
without a constitution.”68
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Ayub Khan used religion to justify the war against India. He used the
Muslim/Hindu animosity to his advantage and he used any means necessary to
show the Pakistani people that this war was just. The military had to defend
Islam’s and Pakistan’s existence. The Kashmir issue and the security of
Pakistan against India created a need for the military. This war reminded
Pakistanis how much the military was needed to protect their nation. He knew
very well that he could use Jihad and the survival of Islam on the Subcontinent to
justify the war.
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan – This conflict began in December of
1979 and played a crucial role in General Zia-al Haq’s Islamic agenda. Pakistan
was in the perfect position to play the concerned neighbor. Zia saw an
opportunity to convince Islamists that this invasion was a threat against Islam.
Recruits came from all over the world. He used the ISI to assist in training the
mujahideen (freedom fighters) and supply them with arms given by the United
States. “The ranks of the ISI were expanding as the agency handled the
recruitment, training, and operations of Afghan mujahideen.”69 An Islamist
based education system, brought in by the Pakistani government, was put in
place for the Afghan refugees. The purpose of this education was to convert
these refugees into freedom fighters with a deep and passionate Islamist
mentality.
Zia also made sure that the Islamist political parties of Pakistan played a role
in this war. “As the scope of the Afghan jihad expanded, so did the influence of
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Islamist ideology in Pakistan. Ever mindful of the need to retain control, Zia
made sure that Jamaat-e-Islami was not the only Pakistan party involved with the
Afghan refugees and militants.”70
In August of 1998 Zia was killed in a mysterious plane crash over region of
Bahawalpur in India. The cause of the crash remains unknown.
Zia’s legacy is not well regarded by any means. His desire to legitimize his
leadership by implementing Islamic policies was quite transparent. He used any
means necessary to gain that legitimacy. He used money from the United States
to fund the Afghan war, to train the mujahideen, and to increase the strength of
the Islamic parties. “Zia exploited the deeply-held religious sentiments of various
factions and set them against the minorities for the perpetuation of his hold on
them.”71
The Military in the Government
The 1958 Military Takeover – Mohammad Ayub Khan was born in the village
of Rehana in 1907. His birthplace was about fifty miles from the major military
cantonment in Rawalpindi, which at the time was in the western part of the Indian
subcontinent. His father served in the British Indian army, and was a pious
Muslim.72 Ayub attended Sandhurst Military College in England and joined the
British Indian Army in 1928. He commanded an infantry battalion in World War II
and chose to join the Pakistan Army after partition. He had a rapid succession of
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promotions during the first few turbulent years of the young country of Pakistan.
He went from colonel in August of 1947 to commanding the Pakistan Army by
September 1950. He became the first Pakistani to hold this prestigious title. The
British had appointed a British General to oversee the military after partition.
When the British General retired from his post as army commander, Ayub was
chosen to be his successor.73
Pakistan’s first ten years were turbulent. The first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan was assassinated in 1951. Seven years later, as the commander of the
Pakistan Army, Field Marshall Ayub Khan had his men seize control of the
country. Martial law overtook Pakistan for the first time and Ayub had a plan in
place. “He was convinced that Pakistan needed more, not less, centralized
government, that the decision-making process had to be narrowly focused and
made the responsibility of experts and specialists. Precious time had been lost in
petty political maneuvering, the country’s development had suffered from a
decade of neglect, and a diverse and impatient population had become restive
and more difficult to control.”74
The 1977 Military Coup d’état - Zia-al-Haq was born in 1924 into a lowermiddle-class family of East Punjab, India. His father worked in a government
department as a clerical worker. Zia joined the British Indian Army and
graduated soon after World War II. During the 1947 partition of the Indian
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subcontinent, he “was an escort officer on the last Pakistani train with refugees…
to leave the Indian city of Babina for Pakistan.”75
By 1972, Zia had been promoted to Major-General following the
reorganization of the Pakistan Army after General Yahya’s fall and Bhutto’s rise
to power. Bhutto had been told about Zia from an Army officer by the name of
General Gul Hassan. In 1976, Bhutto appointed Zia to be the Chief of the Army
Staff (the highest post in the army). There were many qualified army generals
above Zia. However, Bhutto had reasons for choosing a Mohajir (a class of
people who migrated to Pakistan from India during Partition) as the leader of the
army. The army was made up of mostly Punjabis and Pathans (both groups of
people were indigenous to Pakistan before partition). To give this post to
someone outside this circle was something the high officers could not accept and
many resigned.76 Bhutto had hoped this would cause Zia to look to him for
assistance. “Bhutto’s tactics were aimed at bringing the army high command to
heel. In the end, however, he only energized the movement that would unseat
and destroy him.”77
In 1976 a conspiracy between the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) took place with the intention of removing Benazir Bhutto from power. The
ISI, in October of 1976, sent a memo to Bhutto titled, “General Elections.” It
advised Bhutto that if he held elections now he would win without any serious
opposition. It also exuberantly praised Bhutto’s leadership. Bhutto was then
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convinced to hold elections for the National Assembly in March of 1977.78 The
religious parties, joined by two secular parties and the Muslim League, created
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The support for this party was
overwhelming. The results of the elections were suspected of being rigged, but
by who remains unknown. The PNA claims it was Bhutto’s PPP that rigged the
elections and Bhutto seems to have at least tried to appease the PNA by offering
to let the PNA run unopposed for certain National Assembly seats.79 The PNA
decided to express their grievances on the streets of Pakistan. Mass protests
broke out and Bhutto asked the military for help. In April, the PNA and Bhutto
agreed to meet for talks. “On July 5, 1977, although participants in the parleys
stated the two sides were close to agreement over holding fresh elections, the
military took over. They claimed that it was forced to intervene because Bhutto’s
talks with the PNA were going nowhere and the country was on the brink of
complete breakdown.”80
When the army intervenes in Pakistan it does so with a desire to return the
country to order, or so it states. In this case, by creating the chaos brought on by
likely rigged elections, the military created a legitimate reason to come back into
power. This time they linked with the Islamist parties to achieve their goal.
“…Zia’s close ties with the Islamists who led the agitation that provided him with
the excuse for his coup indicate greater forethought on his part than is often
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conceded.”81 Zia’s plan for his Pakistan was to be Islamic in every respect. He
created the connections necessary to fully implement this theme long before he
came into power.
The 1999 Military Coup - Pervez Musharraf was born in New Delhi in British
India in 1943. He belonged to a middle-class, well-educated family. They
migrated to Pakistan during the partition four years later. They were able to
catch the last train leaving Delhi, India to Karachi, Pakistan. The haunting
memories of that journey shaped who Musharraf is today. 82 He joined the
Pakistan army at the age of eighteen and he was involved in the 1965 and 1971
wars. After the 1965 War, he was awarded his first medal for gallantry after he
refused to leave his post when it ignited by shellfire”83 Musharraf was an
impressive officer moving up in ranks as the years passed. He joined the Special
Services Group (SSG-commandos), where he served for a total of seven years.
This group takes on a hectic lifestyle and dangerous missions.84
On October 12, 1999 General Musharraf was returning to Pakistan from Sri
Lanka aboard a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flight destined for Karachi.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had planned to remove Musharraf from office during
this trip and replace him and his loyal military colleagues. Musharraf had a
contingency plan in place should an event like this occur. The PIA plane carrying
Musharraf was told to divert to the Middle East, it was not allowed to land at
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Karachi airport nor its back-up airport of Nawabshah, Pakistan (fifty miles from
Karachi). Sharif’s people had ordered the Karachi airport to shut down its
airstrip. Eventually the military was able to commandeer the air traffic control
room and open up the airstrip for the PIA flight. The military had also taken over
the Prime Minister’s residence in Islamabad. The plane landed safely and
military rule began yet again in Pakistan.85
To cement the power of the military in politics, General Musharraf took two
instrumental steps. First, he reinstated Article 58(2) (b) and second, he created
the National Security Council (NSC). These two acts “institutionalized the
military’s control of politics.”86 Article 58(2) (b) allows the president to disband
the government.87 This article has been removed and added to the constitution
numerous times. The military leaders prefer that it remain in the constitution.
The NSC transformed the military’s role from one of policy maker to an
organization that had equal footing with the civilian and political sectors of the
country. Ayesha Siddiqa argues that, “…the economic stakes of the military elite,
and their financial autonomy, played a vital role in persuading them to push for
an independent status for the organization (NSC).”88
Musharraf stepped down as Army Chief in late 2007. He was sworn in as a
civilian president immediately after resigning from the military. Elections were
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held in March of 2008 and the PPP came in first with the most number of the
Parliamentary seats.
He resigned from office in August 2008, while an impeachment process was
being conducted against him.89 For now, the military is in the background and a
civilian government rules the country. The military has practiced this form of
indirect control before. With violent conditions currently in the Swat Valley region
of Pakistan, it is only a matter of time before the military steps out of the shadows
and into the governmental system yet again.
These three military leaders were able to easily enter the political system due
to the absence of civil supremacy in the Pakistan governmental system. The
lack of strong civil institutions allowed these generals to quickly takeover the
civilian governments. These actions create a vicious cycle in which a proper,
established governmental system is unable to create foundation to build upon.
These military men used Islam for their own selfish purpose to extend and justify
their intervention in the governmental system. This cycle will most likely continue
its destructive course.
Islamization and the Military
The military leaders introduced Islamic agendas during their time in office.
Different tactics used by these men were intended to solidify and justify their
leadership position. Also, the military would often appease the Islamists who
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were watching the actions of the military closely to judge how well the military
leader kept the Islamists satisfied.
The Islamization of Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq - In Zia’s first speech he
mentioned the PNA’s protests as a sign that it was time to bring Islam into the
forefront of the government. “It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the
name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I
consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the
country.”90 Thanks to the PNA’s riots, Z. Bhutto was out and the military was in
power. Zia’s religious ways and the Islamists role in bringing the military into
power were a sign of things to come. “Zia-al-Haq not only attained power as a
result of the mosque-military alliance, he also worked assiduously to strengthen it
over the next eleven years.”91
One of the more important signs of Zia’s Islamic Pakistan was the
implementation of Zakat collection in 1980. This is the yearly tax of 2.5% of
one’s assets that Muslims are expected pay. “The government announced that it
would deduct Zakat from bank accounts and distribute it through a central Zakat
administration.”92 He also brought Sharia (religious) Courts into the Pakistan
government. “Zia called the Shariat Courts a high-priority item on his reform
agenda, and he justified the action by insisting that Pakistan had been created
for the purpose of providing Islamic justice.” He did explain that these courts
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would be an addition to the regular courts already in place.93 Zia also changed
the primary and higher education systems to reflect the strong presence of Islam
infiltrating the entire state. “Textbooks were rewritten with an Islamist ideological
agenda…students were being taught that Pakistan was a fortress of Islam.”94 He
also turned his attention to the university system in Pakistan, and wanted to fire
all secular professors. Also, the role of madrassas became more important. Zia
declared that a diploma from a madrassa would be equivalent to a university
degree, therefore enabling these graduates to be eligible for government jobs.95
Zia had intended to go about Islamicizing the country at a fast rate. However, the
nation was far from ready to receive this kind of overhaul. “The nation’s
underdevelopment in a wide array of categories, not the least of which was a
paucity of Islamic jurists, prevented the instant manifestation of the Islamic
state…he attempted too much too soon.”96
Islamization under Pervez Musharraf - Musharraf’s opinion on the Taliban
in Afghanistan was one of hesitant acceptance. He believed that their version of
Islam was, “ignorant and primitive…It is condemned by the entire Islamic
world.”97 The only reason he gave for supporting the Taliban regime was, “the
national interest and security issues dictated Pakistan’s policies and the country
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could not afford a threat from Afghanistan’s side in addition to the one in the East
(India).”98 National security was the reason behind this decision. Pakistan was
already defending itself from India to the east; if the western border became a
security issue as well Pakistan would not survive.
In the nearly two years between the coup and 9/11, Musharraf made weak
attempts to reign in the Islamists in Pakistan. A few days after the successful
coup, Musharraf gave his first major policy speech, “[…he categorically asked]
the clergy to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and
bring bad name to our faith.” 99 He tried to take action on his words by
attempting to reform the Blasphemy Law in April 2000. This law allowed anyone
to accuse someone else of blasphemy which would lead to their arrest. Abuses
of this law were rampant. Musharraf’s change to the law would, “require the case
to be registered only if the district administration had first investigated the
veracity of the accusation.”100 The Islamic parties were in an uproar over this
procedural change. Due to their reaction, Musharraf backed down.
Musharraf expressed his opinion about religious extremism during a speech
he gave to religious scholars and clerics in June, 2001. “Is there any doubt that
we have been left behind although we claim Islam will carry us forward in every
age, every circumstance and every land…How does the world judge our claim?
It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other. And now we
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want to spread violence and terror abroad. Naturally the world regards us as
terrorists. Our claim of tolerance is phony.”101
Musharraf saw a difference between the Kashmiri Islamists and the Islamists
in Pakistan before and after 9/11. “Musharraf’s government has continued to
make a distinction between “terrorists” (a term applied to Al Qaeda members,
mainly of foreign origin) and “freedom fighters” (the officially preferred label in
Pakistan for Kashmiri militants).”102 It shows favoritism for one group over the
other. The desire of the military government to designate a different title to the
Kashmiri fighter shows their agenda in that region. The fighting is justified in
Kashmir. It is for the purpose of freeing the Kashmiris from Indian rule.
Musharraf was giving mixed messages about Islamic extremists before 9/11.
The fear of retaliation from the extremists was holding him back. Within a few
days after 9/11, Musharraf’s stance on the Taliban completely changed. The
pressure came from the United States to align with the West or become the
enemy. Musharraf “had taken a historical U-turn in its policy toward the Taliban
by fully supporting the U.S. military campaign. On the domestic scene,
Musharraf started to announce measures against the hard-line religious groups
and limit the license of the mullahs.”103 The Islamists voiced their opinion in
many ways. Musharraf had been the target of numerous assassination attempts
since 9/11. The Indian Parliament was a victim of their violent retaliation on
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December 13, 2001. The Islamists attacked the Parliament building in the capital
city of Delhi. Five individuals drove up to the building and began firing shots.
Twelve people (including the five terrorists) were killed in the attack. No member
of the government was hurt during the attack.
India responded by lining up military troops along their 1,800 mile border with
Pakistan. Musharraf then announced the arrest of fifty members of Lashkar-eTaiba, a terrorist group which declared responsibility for the attack. Then the
arrest of their leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and another leader of Jaish-eMuhammad did nothing to appease the Indian government. In January,
Musharraf gave a speech in which he declared, he would not allow terrorism in
the name of Kashmir…Pakistani officials arrested several hundred militants only
to release them a few days later, including the two leaders mentioned above. “It
was clear that the ISI was not keen to offend its jihadi partners by keeping them
in prison for too long.”104 The partnership between the Islamist groups and the
government is one-sided. The Islamist groups know that the government needs
them and the government realizes that the militants have the upper hand in their
relationship.
After two assassination attempts on Musharraf eleven days apart, the
Pakistani government realized they needed to take drastic measures. They
arrested or killed many militants, yet many have eluded capture. “The ISI paid
substantial amounts of ‘severance pay’ to jihadi leaders such as Hafiz
Muhammad Saeed (leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba) and Maulana Masoon Azhar
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(leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad) and Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil (of Harkatul
Mujahideen) in return for their agreement to remain dormant for an unspecified
duration.”105 Not surprisingly, the ISI seems to be operating independently of
Musharraf’s government. Even though the ISI is a branch of the military, it runs
its own agenda, separate from the military. By aligning itself with the Islamists,
the ISI has become larger and more powerful than the military could have
imagined. The ISI has a close relationship with the militants, closer than
Musharraf would have ever wanted during his time in office.
In summary, the Pakistan government and the militants have had a
relationship that meets both of their needs. The military government uses them
to cause chaos and it gives the military the excuse it needs to step in and take
over. The militants receive protection and special treatment from the military
establishment. The government keeps them close enough to use their presence
to their power advantage. However, the militants make sure that their power is
never forgotten. “Pakistan’s rulers have attempted to manage militant Islamism,
trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without
destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries…the state has
supported Islamists groups to influence domestic politics and support the
military’s political dominance.”106
The role of the ISI and the Islamists is the crucial link between the military and
the Islamists. They have been responsible for numerous events that have
104

Ibid., p. 306

105

Haqqani, 2007, p. 150

55

jeopardized any chance at democracy in Pakistan and they will continue this path
of terror and instability in the region.
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CHAPTER 4
ISLAMISM AND ISLAMISTS
Islam as a Political Ideology
Since partition, the Pakistani military has been a key player in giving Pakistan
an Islamic identity. Islam was used to create a separate nation for the Muslims
of the Indian Subcontinent. In wars between India and Pakistan, it again became
the rallying cry for the military to gain support and legitimacy from the masses.
When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the Islamic agenda became
international. Recruits came from all over the world to fight the Russians. It
became a war between Communists and Islam.
The religion has been used repeatedly to gain power and legitimacy by the
military and the Islamists. “…part of the state apparatus used religion and
religious groups for a political purpose. The extent of the religious groups
influence and the sentiment unleashed by them could not be controlled. And the
military stepped in to deal with the symptoms of the chaos generated by
religious-political agitation, without any effort to deal with its causes.” 107
Islamism in Pakistan
A large number of Islamists in Pakistan use political parties to achieve their
goals. One of the most well known is Jamiat-e-Islami. This political party and
others have gained some power in the Pakistani parliament. The Islamists have
also aligned themselves with the military establishment numerous times to further
their own agenda in Pakistani politics.
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Islamist Groups - The Jamaat-e-Islami (translated as Islamic society or
Islamic party) was active in politics during the formation of Pakistan and is still
active today. It was created six years before independence in 1941 and its
founder was Maulana Maududi. His beliefs stem from the idea that Islam is as
much an ideology as a religion. He believes this Islamic ideology continues the
mission of the prophets. This mission was as follows:
1-To revolutionize the intellectual and mental outlook of humanity
and to instill the Islamic attitude toward life and morality to such an
extent that their way of thinking, ideal in life, and standards of
values and behaviors become Islamic.
2-To regiment all such people who have accepted Islamic ideals
and mold their lives after the Islamic pattern with a view to
struggling for power and seizing it by the use of all available means
and equipment.
3-To establish Islamic rule and organize the various aspects of
social life on Islamic bases, to adopt such means as will widen the
sphere of Islamic influence in the world, and to arrange for the
moral and intellectual training, by contact and example, of all those
people who enter the fold of Islam from time to time. 108
Author Husain Haqqani quotes Sayyed Nasr, “The Jamaat legitimated
communalism in Islamic terms and helped the League find a base of support by
appealing to religious symbols. The Muslim League, in turn, increasingly
Islamized the political discourse on Pakistan to the Jamaat’s advantage, creating
a suitable gateway for the party’s entry into the political foray.”109 The Muslim
League and the Jamaat used each other to achieve their own goals and this
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resulted in legitimizing the political function of the other in furthering their
communalist cause.110 Maulana Maududi believed in regimenting the Muslim
population and placing a belief system in their thinking that was not that different
from Pakistan’s nation builders. They considered regimentation necessary to
iron out the creases in the design of the nation-state united primarily by the
religion of its citizens. Maududi wanted to inspire a large group of Muslims who
would not want power but would lead by example.111 His idealistic views are not
practical in an environment of chaos and power struggles. Pakistan was not the
place for a man like Maulana Maududi.
The leaders wanted to use his ideas but not him as the representative of the
ideas. “The Muslim League leaders saw Maududi as a rival claimant for popular
support...some saw elements of totalitarianism in his concept of pious leadership
while other considered Jamaat-e-Islami’s revolutionary rhetoric dangerous.”112
Maudadi felt they were not the right leaders for the nation. “The slogan of the
party is, ‘the country is God’s; rule must be by God’s law; the government should
be that of God’s pious men.’”113 Of course, Maududi felt his party would be the
one to have the most pious individual to represent the country. His party was
instrumental in influencing theologians to support an Islamic constitution. The
first constitution was adopted in 1956 by Prime Minister Muhammad Ali. It gave
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Pakistan the official name of, “The Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” The followers
of Maududi give credit to him for this Islamic influence in the first of many
constitutions of Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami has become one of the country’s most
organized and internationally visible religious parties, even though its numbers
remain small in relation to the population of the country.114 Its presence and
influence is still relevant over sixty-five years after its founding.
The university level organization of the Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in 1947 by
a group of students that had been inspired by Maulana Maududi. The Islami
Jami’at-e-Talaba (Islamic Students Society, also known as IJT) was considered
the student wing of the JI; however, it took a more radical viewpoint. The
members clashed with more left-minded students on campuses. As these
members graduated and became members of the parent organization, the JI
became more political than it ever had been under the guidance of Maulana
Maududi. “It no longer stuck to a single modus operandi and was now willing to
explore all possible avenues toward expanding its influence and ideology.”115
During the 2002 elections, the Muslim League decided to join the Islamists
parties under the name of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). They won 18 percent
of parliament seats, which was a first in the history of Pakistan elections. The
MMA also gained control of the NWFP region. This control “made it a breeding
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ground for religious extremism, shaping the fundamentalists’ leanings of their
Afghan neighbors, the Taliban.”116
Islamic Militants Role in the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan – “The
American assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, which kept increasing, was a
critical factor in tilting the operational balance against the Soviet Union.”117
The Islamists grew in numbers and power during the war. This was due to
the assistance of the ISI branch of the Pakistan military. The war was against a
non-Muslim nation and therefore became a Jihad in the eyes of the Islamists.
The ISI had their own agenda and the Islamists were the perfect recruits. The ISI
were instrumental in educating and training the Islamists. After the war was over,
these trained Islamists came into Pakistan along with large numbers of Afghani
refugees. The Islamists became involved in the ongoing Kashmir conflict and the
sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias.
Madrassas played a crucial role during the Afghanistan war with Russia from
1979 to 1989. They were churning out religious individuals ready to fight the
communists. “The Madrasa assembly lines had started to turn out gun fodder in
increasing quantities. According to a retired Pakistani general, Kamal Matinuddin,
Zia established a chain of deeni madaris (religious schools) along the AfghanPakistani border…in order to create a belt of religiously oriented students who
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would assist the Afghan Mujahideen to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan.118
Again, the military was deeply involved in the training of Mujahideen.
After the war these trained Islamists migrated to the Kashmir region to fight
another enemy of Islam (India). As previously mentioned, after 9/11 Musharraf
had described the individuals fighting in the Kashmir region as freedom fighters.
He called the extremists in Afghanistan terrorists. Only under pressure, from the
United States, did he eventually call both groups terrorists.
Sectarianism and Islamism
The military manipulates the sectarian and ethnic divisions to legitimize the
need for military intervention. “…the ethnic and sectarian divide in Pakistan has
played a significant role in contributing to praetorianism through its promotion of
civil-military alliances and counter-alliances which have at times legitimized
military intervention.”119
The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni and Shia. The main distinction
between the two sects is their differing belief as to who was to take over the
leadership of the Islamic Empire after the death of Prophet Muhammad. The
Sunnis believe Prophet Muhammad named his successor, Abu Bakr, and
therefore no doubt exists as to who would lead the Muslims. However, the Shia
believed that the next leader ought to be from the bloodline of the Prophet.
There have been numerous conflicts between these two groups over the years.
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These groups are easy to manipulate, which has lead to them becoming pawns
of the military.
The sectarian violence has the potential to create bitter divides between the
Shias and Sunnis. “The sectarian divide has a greater potential for causing
instability and the possible ‘Lebanonization’ of Pakistan than any provincial/ethnic
divide because of the higher levels of emotion and consequent religious
fanaticism.”120
Ethnic divisions have also contributed their fair share of violence in Pakistan.
The population of Pakistan is mostly Muslim, but their ethnic origin can be more
important and meaningful than their religion. “Ethnic violence in Pakistan has
been abundant; particularly since the 1980s…between 1985 and 1992 over
3,000 people have lost their lives in the province of Sindh as a result of ethnic
violence between the indigenous Sindhis and the minority Mohajirs.”121
An example of how the military manipulates ethnic tensions follows, “the
widespread ethnic clashes in Karachi between Mohajirs on the one side and the
Pathans and Punjabis on the other in the mid and late 1980s (during Zia’s rule)
were widely believed to have been engineered by the intelligence agencies in
order to maintain the need for military rule.”122 They used any means necessary
to maintain rule, even if it involved bloodshed of fellow Pakistanis.
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Because these division cause such impassioned responses from the
participants it is highly unlikely they realize they are being used. It is
discouraging to see the military and the Islamists use such violent measures
against the population to sustain their power over the country.
Contemporary Islamist Conflicts
There have been many conflicts in recent times that have involved Islamists
with connections to Pakistan. This section will discuss the attacks on various
locations in Mumbai, India and also the current conflict in the Northwest region of
Pakistan. These exemplify the fact that Pakistan is and will continue to be, at
least in the near future, a hotbed for religious extremism.
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks - On November 26, 2008, Mumbai, India was
victim to a terrorist attack that involved five different locations in the large city.
The targets included two hotels, a train station, a restaurant and a Jewish center.
173 people were killed by ten gunmen. India has stated that a Pakistan based
terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba is responsible for the attacks.123 The purpose of
these attacks by Islamic militant groups is to jeopardize any hope of friendly
relations between Pakistan and India. Insecure relations with their larger and
more powerful neighbor feed the instability in the region. Islamists thrive and
grow in this type of environment.
The Present Conflict in Swat Valley - The Swat Valley is located in
Northern Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan, in the North West Frontier Province
(better known as the NWFP). The conflict began in early May of 2009 between
123

Mumbai Evidence Given to Pakistan.

64

Taliban forces based in this area and the Pakistan military. It was in response to
the peace deal between that fell apart; and also attempts by the Taleban to
expand their area of control.124The Taleban are infiltrating Pakistan with plans to
make it an Islamic nation to their liking.125 According to the BBC’s Shoaib Hasan,
the ISI created the Taleban to create a larger military to combat India’s massive
military size. The ISI strategy saw that having Afghanistan would allow for the
Pakistani military to have, “geographic strategic depth in case of war with
India.”126 According the army officials, around 15,000 military forces are in the
region combating 4,000 to 5,000 Taleban men.127 Unfortunately, due to the
fighting, numerous civilians have had to evacuate their villages. This massive
influx of refugees, nearly 2 million since august of 2008128, has created additional
problems for the Pakistani government.
Can the Islamists be involved in a more democratic system of government in
Pakistan? Can they accept secular opposition in the political party system?
Their history does not give either of these questions a positive answer. They are
adamant that their way of life is the best way for Pakistan. When they disagree
they express it through violence. It does not seem feasible that they will be
willing to sit down and discuss disagreements with others involved in the political
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system. They weaken the somewhat democratic system that exists in Pakistan
now. They have been responsible for assassinating leaders who are trying to
practice democracy. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the Swat Valley
conflict are recent examples of how they marginalize the democratic process.
They are more comfortable with aggression rather than discussion. Pakistan’s
future is a bleak one. The military and the Islamists are fighting for control. The
weak civilian system is unable to become involved in this fight for the leadership
of Pakistan. Is there hope for this civilian system? Even if someone did come up
from society to try to change the future of Pakistan, that person would most likely
be the victim of an assassination. Islamists do not debate someone with different
views then their own; they remove them from the process violently. This has
become a fact of life in Pakistan.
“Unless Islamabad’s objectives are redefined to focus on economic prosperity
and popular participation in governance – which the military as an institution
remains reluctant to do – the state will continue to turn to Islam as a national
unifier.”129 The country’s leaders have relied on this strategy of Islam as the
“national unifier” for so long. Any hope of change will be very difficult. Old habits
die hard and with such violent opposition in Pakistan, the necessary changes will
be difficult to achieve.
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CHAPTER 5
DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Islam and the State
Pakistan has been led by a handful of civilian leaders. They each had
significant dealings with the military and the Islamists. The civilian leaders have
used Islam and the Islamists as a way of justifying their rule and strengthening
their power. In regards to their relationship with the military, these civilian
leaders have had to appease this establishment to protect their own position of
leadership. All but one, Asif Ali Zardari (the current leader), has been removed
from power by the military. He has been the President since September 2008
and the question that must be asked is how long it will be until the military
removes him from power.
Civilian Leaders
This chapter will discuss and analyze four civilian leaders and their brief time
in power. It will look at how each of these leaders has attempted to satisfy both
the military powers lurking in the background and also the Islamists that
constantly claim that these civilian leaders never protect the interests of Islam.
The presence of patrimonialism is strong in the civilian leaders; the fact that three
of the four leaders come from the same family confirms the practice of
patrimonialism in the civilian politics of Pakistan.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – He was born in 1928 in the Larkana area of the Sindh
province and his father was a feudal landlord. Z. Bhutto attended the University
of California, Berkeley and obtained a degree in Political Science and continued
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his education at Oxford University. He also studied at Christ Church College,
and received his graduate degree in jurisprudence in 1952.130 He was a part of
the leadership in Pakistan since the late 1950s and was included in General
Ayub’s “inner circle”, as a confidant and advisor.131 Under Ayub, Z. Bhutto
served as the foreign minister and the natural resources minister.132 Zulfikar
Bhutto left Ayub’s cabinet in June, 1966.133 His decision to leave was mostly due
to the debacle of the 1965 war, it was embarrassing and upsetting for Bhutto; he
felt that Ayub had caved to the demands of the West and lost Kashmir. He
resigned from the cabinet and within a year and a half created his own political
party.
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was created in late 1967 with welcoming
arms by the populace. Z. Bhutto was quite popular with the youth who had
become disgusted with the way Ayub had handled the 1965 war. They were
looking for a young, charismatic leader to change the direction of Pakistan’s
future and Z. Bhutto fit that role perfectly. He rallied the masses to oppose the
unpopular military leadership. The basic principles of his political party are as
follows: “Islam is our faith, democracy is our politics, socialism is our economy,
and all power to the people.”134
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Zulfikar Bhutto, through his Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP), became Prime
Minister in 1971. Every leader of the PPP since its inception has been a Bhutto
by blood or marriage. After Z. Bhutto’s death in 1979, his wife Nusrat took over.
Their daughter Benazir was next to become the Chairwoman of the party. She
held that position until her assassination in December of 2007. In her will she
gave the chairmanship to her son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. Her husband, Asif Ali
Zardari, is presently the chairman of the PPP and also the current president of
Pakistan. It is expected that Bilawal will take control of his grandfather’s party
once he completes his education at Oxford University.
During his rule, Z. Bhutto did make attempts to appease the religious side of
the populace. “The 1973 Constitution declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic, with
Islam as the religion of the state.”135 These steps created the foundation for
enforcing the shariah and the potential for giving legitimacy to religious groups.136
He also hosted the Islamic Summit in 1974; this gathering of Islamic nations
“created an environment of expectancy for Islamic unity and possible Islamic
social order.”137
Additional attempts to appease Islamists Z. Bhutto included declaring the
Ahmadi religious group a minority in 1974. Bhutto was not religious man, but he
shrewdly understood what must be done to protect his position of leadership;
rather than confront the powerful religious groups, he marginalized the
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controversial Ahmadi group. “Through an amendment in 1974, persons who do
not believe in the finality of the prophet are non-Muslims in the legal sense.”138
The Ahmadis do not consider Islam’s Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet.
For Muslims, Prophet Muhammad is considered the last of God’s prophets sent
to earth. By going against this basic belief Islam, many Muslims declare
Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This became a huge issue after an incident at a
railway station in the small town of Rabway in the Punjab province. The
Ahmadi’s account of the incident is as follows. While the train was at a
scheduled stop in the city of Rabwah, some members of the IJT (the student
branch of the JI) became verbally abusive towards an Ahmadi woman. They
hurled anti-Ahmadi insults at her. Fellow Ahmadis on the train came to her
defense and beat the young men. The IJI, on the other hand, claim that Ahmadi
leaders were passing out religious handouts on the train and this upset the IJT
members enough to lead to a violent altercation.139
The Rabway incident became the catalyst necessary for the IJT to argue for
the denunciation of the Ahmadi group as a true sect of Islam. Soon after, many
other religious political parties joined in this tirade. By declaring the Ahmadis a
minority, Bhutto was giving in to the demands of the religious-political groups.
“Instead of taking the risk of confronting the religious agitators, Bhutto decided to
concede their demand.”140 These parties did not feel Z. Bhutto was religious
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enough to lead an Islamic country. He was known to drink and considered a
womanizer, which they felt, was inappropriate behavior for a devout Muslim.
Also, his party had a socialist manifesto, which clashed with the Islamists view of
how Pakistan should be run. Z. Bhutto was under pressure to secure the support
of these Islamic political parties, because without their backing his position in
power would be in jeopardy.
General Zia-al-Haq of the Pakistan Army took over Z. Bhutto’s government in
a 1977 coup. Bhutto was subsequently brought to trial on charges of attempted
murder of a political opponent. His execution took place in April of 1977. The
questionable methods of the court to try and convict Bhutto were orchestrated by
General Zia and the Islamist political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami. This was the
tragic end to one of the most charismatic leaders that Pakistan has witnessed.
However, his family legacy and political party would continue through his
daughter and son-in-law.
The next two civilian rulers were Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Between
1988 and 1999, these two each ruled Pakistan twice. This back and forth was
due to the military’s and Islamists presence in politics. Even though they were
not directly in control, their presence was strong enough to influence the direction
these leaders took the nation.
Benazir Bhutto (Prime Minister from November 1988 through August 1990) Benazir Bhutto was the daughter of Zulfikar and Nusrat Bhutto. She was born in
1953 in Karachi, Pakistan. She earned her Bachelor’s in comparative
government at Harvard University and continued her studies at Oxford. B. Bhutto
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was in her teens during her father’s time as the Prime Minister. During his
subsequent trial and execution her personality was forming into a person forever
burned by the military government. She led the PPP with great fervor and
demanded democracy, but she constantly found herself fighting the military
establishment that killed her father. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on
December 27, 2007. She had returned to Pakistan after many years in exile and
was planning to run in the upcoming January elections. Even though her times in
office were overshadowed by questionable ethics by both her and her husband,
Asif Ali Zardari, she died a martyr in her followers’ eyes. Her father’s Pakistan
People’s Party became the patrimonial symbol of her return to power. The only
leaders of this party have been the founder, his wife, his daughter, and presently
the daughter’s husband. This practice is indicative of a patrimonial and neopatrimonial approach to government. The PPP will not allow anyone outside the
family a chance to run the party.
The Pakistan populace had become so cynical of politics during the reign of
General Musharraf. To have Benazir, the daughter of the first family of Pakistani
politics, return from exile and run again for the high office gave the people of
Pakistan the hope they had lost so long ago. This hope overshadowed the fact
that B. Bhutto might not be the best choice to move Pakistan forward. She rode
the coattails of her father’s legacy. The Pakistani people placed all their hopes
on the Bhutto legacy to pull them out of the mess of eleven years of military rule.
The practice of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism is present in the PPP and
the people of the country deeply desired a return to this patrimonial political
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party. The people have witnessed this type of civilian government system more
than any other. It is important to keep in mind that the founder of the PPP was
and is still considered one the most charismatic and impressionable civilian
leaders that Pakistan has witnessed. Any link to him is enough for many
Pakistanis. The fact that Z. Bhutto’s son-in-law is the current president of
Pakistan proves this point. It says a great amount about this civilian population.
In some respects they are not developed enough to advance to more democratic
system of government because they are unwilling to let go of the PPP and what it
stood for in their eyes.
After the death of General Zia in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, new
elections were in the works. The army realized that they must step back and let
their obvious control become invisible. This lead to more behind the scenes
attempts at controlling the elections of 1988. A coalition party created to
compete against Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 elections was organized by the Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) branch of the military. This coalition, the Islami
Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI-Islamic Democratic Alliance), was a mix of Islamist and
promilitary parties. It was created by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, General
Mirza Aslam Beg. His intention was to continue the military’s presence in politics
after the death of Zia-al-Haq. The ISI funded the political party and also had the
Jamaa-e-Islami join it to increase its chances of winning. Lieutenant General
Gul, head of the ISI, threatened the JI’s role in the Afghanistan jihad operations if
they did not join the coalition. The JI, under pressure from the ISI, then agreed to
join the IJI and also campaigned against Benazir Bhutto. However, the country
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was ready for change. The army did not foresee a strong response to the PPP.
Despite the ISI’s involvement in the opposition to the PPP, Benazir’s party won
ninety-two seats out of 215, while the IJI won fifty-four.141 The win did not mean
the end of the military’s involvement in politics. They made sure that one of the
leaders of the IJI, Nawaz Sharif, was made the chief minister of the Punjab
province (the largest and most powerful province of Pakistan). Having a member
of the opposition as the chief minister of the largest province would keep Benazir
wary. The president of the country was Ishaq Khan, a friend of the military. The
leadership of Pakistan was shared by three people: the prime minster, the
president, and the army chief of staff. Prime Minister Bhutto had to appease the
other two to remain in office.
The Islamists attacked her almost immediately. “Soon after her
election…several ulama issued a fatwa (religious edict) declaring that a woman
could not be head of government in an Islamic country…The leader of the
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) argued that her real vulnerability lay in her ‘lack of credibility’
on national security issues…she could not be trusted with the country’s nuclear
program and the jihad in Afghanistan.”142
Another attack she endured was from the ISI. They used the controversial
Salman Rushdie book, Satanic Verses to create problems for Benazir’s
government. In February of 1989, violent protests against the book occurred in
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Islamabad. Muslims felt that the book demeaned Prophet Muhammad and also
contained inappropriate passages.
…the book had been published a year earlier, in 1988, and no one
in the Muslim world had taken notice of it until Pakistani clericpolitician Maulana Kausar Niazi wrote a series of articles about it in
the Pakistani press….he said that a copy of the book with offensive
passages duly highlighted had been sent to him by a senior official
in the ISI…As for the ISI’s motives, the agency was repeating what
Pakistani intelligence services had successfully done in the past: it
was hoping to embarrass a civilian government over an emotive
religious issue.143
This embarrassment drew international attention and increased the animosity
between the Islamists and Benazir, all at the hands of the ISI. The ISI made sure
to keep their role in this incident secret. Benazir Bhutto was removed from office
in August 1990 by President Ishaq Haq. He claimed to be following military
orders. “The Bhutto government operated against the backdrop of a hostile
military establishment that was prepared to use any opportunity to remove her
from power…the young prime minister was seen as ‘the symbol of a democratic
Pakistan.’”144 Any chance of democracy, no matter how small, would threaten
the strong grip the military had on the governmental system of Pakistan. Her ties
to the United States also concerned the military establishment. A relationship
with the most powerful nation in the world could weaken the military’s strength in
Pakistan. Therefore, Bhutto was considered a serious threat and she was
removed from office.
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Nawaz Sharif (Prime Minister from November 1990 through July 1993) Nawaz Sharif was born in Lahore, Pakistan in 1949. His family had migrated
from East Punjab, India in 1947 during the partition. His father opened a steel
factory that became a chain by the 1970s. This was when Z. Bhutto was in office
and nationalized the steel industry. “The Sharifs joined the ranks of many
families who had a personal grudge against the PPP and Z. Bhutto. When Zia
took over in 1977 and the family business was restored to them, they became
strong champions of the general’s cause.”145 Sharif was a graduate of the
Lahore Government College. He served as the finance minister and then the
chief minister of the Punjab province before becoming prime minister.146
In the 1990 elections held after Bhutto’s dismissal, the ISI created an antiBhutto coalition to make sure she did not return to office. The ISI also
contributed large amounts of cash to these anti-Bhutto parties. “An election
slush fund amounting to 150 million rupees (approximately $3 million) was
created at the ISI by General Beg (the current army chief)…ISI chief Lieutenant
General Asad Durrani admitted in an affidavit that he distributed ‘a total of
(Pakistani rupees) 60 million to 20 anti-Bhutto politicians.147’” The IJI won the
elections and the next decision was choosing the new prime minister. Sharif
used his Punjabi ethnic ties to convince many of the Generals that he was the
one to rule and he took office in November of 1990.
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He went along with the ISI to continue the “push for an Islamist government in
Afghanistan and launched its guerilla operations in Indian-controlled parts of
Jammu and Kashmir.”148 During the Gulf War in 1991, Sharif sided with the US
and Saudi Arabia, which was against the wishes of General Beg. Islamists took
to the streets to express their anger at the US war against Iraq. He did try to
please the Islamists on some issues. “He ordered women to cover their heads
on television…during the 1992 Olympic Games, ‘the government refused to allow
women’s swimming events to be shown on television because the swimsuits
were considered too immodest for Islamic sensitivities.149’”
There was an incident in which the Islamists and Sharif disagreed. The 1992
destruction of the historical Babri Mosque in the Indian city of Ayodha caused
vengeful Islamists to destroy Hindu temples. “Sharif’s government cracked down
on the Islamists for attacking the temples.”150
In June of 1993, President Ishaq Khan once again dismissed a civilian ruler.
He “‘accused Sharif of corruption and mismanagement’ and appointed a
caretaker prime minister and dissolved the parliament.”151 The Supreme Court
soon decided that the President’s dismissal of Sharif was unconstitutional.
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“Confrontation between Ishaq Khan and Sharif persisted…and eventually the
army stepped in to convince both Sharif and Ishaq Khan to resign.”152
Benazir Bhutto (Prime Minister from October 1993 through November 1996)
-In the elections of 1993, the country seemed to have had enough of the religious
parties; they received only nine seats in the 207-member National Assembly.
Bhutto’s PPP was able to attain eighty-six seats in the National Assembly, while
Sharif’s PML collected seventy-two seats. However, in the popular vote the PML
had a higher percentage than the PPP. It was a close margin, slightly over one
and a half percent more voted for the PML (39.7 percent for the PML and 38.1
percent for the PPP).153 In the new parliament, Bhutto was able to create a frail
coalition with smaller parties and was voted the prime minister. The new
president was Farooq Leghari, “a Baluch tribal chief from Punjab…who allied
himself with the establishment.”154 The “troika” of Pakistan government again
made the prime minister powerless against the president and the army chief.
Violent riots in Karachi in 1994 considerably weakened Bhutto’s leadership,
which is exactly what the military establishment wanted. Husain Haqqani quotes
Tahir Amin who discusses all the players in this violent episode.
“In Sindh (Karachi is located in this province), the absence of an
agreement on power-sharing between the Muhajir Quami
Movement (MQM) and the PPP, internecine civil war between the
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two factions of the MQM fueled by the covert role of civil and
military intelligence agencies, and sectarian conflict between
extremist Shia and Sunni organizations and possibly Indian
Intelligence Agency (RAW) agents all worked together to create a
proverbial Hobbesian condition of ‘war of all against all’ in Karachi.
This resulted in approximately 800 dead during 1994.”155
Bhutto used great force to gain control of Karachi. Her party representatives
used violent means to establish peace in the port city. The people of Karachi
harbored resentment towards Bhutto for her harsh response.
Another important event that occurred during Bhutto’s time in office was the
Taliban’s increasing power in Afghanistan. The ISI convinced Bhutto to support
this new regime.156 “In March 1996, Bhutto’s government was reported as
having second thoughts about supporting the Taliban…”civilian officials
expressed concerns, ‘about the consequences for Pakistan of a Taliban
government in Kabul, which might foment Muslim fundamentalism, and possibly
even secessionism in Pakistani-ruled tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.’”157
Around the same time, the JI rallied to remove Bhutto from office, most likely due
to her hesitation to support the Taliban regime. Eventually, fourteen parties
joined this opposition alliance.158 In November of 1996, President Leghari
dismissed Bhutto and dissolved parliament. The military had supplied Leghari
with evidence of corruption by Bhutto’s husband, Zardari.159 It was later revealed
that the alleged corruption charges were dropped due to a lack of evidence.
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Nawaz Sharif (Prime Minister from February 1997 through October 1999) -In
the next round of elections held in February of 1997, the same two parties were
the only real contenders. The PML and the PPP were still represented by Sharif
and Bhutto, respectively. Nationwide turnout was around 30 percent…the
electorate was clearly tired of electing governments that faced dismissal within a
couple of years. The low turnout favored the PML, which secured two-thirds of
the seats in the new National Assembly.160 Sharif returned to the position of
Prime Minister, nearly four years after his dismissal.
This time around, Sharif tried to expand the powers of the prime minister.
“Sharif attempted to increase the powers of the prime minister ‘at the expense of
the parliament, the judiciary and the provinces under the pretext of introducing
sharia. This mobilized the ‘orthodox Islamic groups to counterbalance his
political adversaries’ but also increased the leverage of the Islamists.”161 Here is
another example of the government using Islam and the Islamists to strengthen
their own power. By using Islam Sharif gave more power to the Islamists. In the
end, Sharif did not protect his office. He created the means in which to weaken
it. Islamists used it as another reason to disapprove of a non-religious civilian
government.
Another action that angered the Islamists was Sharif’s attempts to broker a
trade deal with India. Both the ISI and the Islamists were in the midst of “large-
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scale jihad operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir that could be jeopardized by
Sharif’s ideas of trade with India.”162 Before the trade talks could take place,
India detonated its first nuclear weapons. These detonations took place on May
11 and 13, 1998, and announced to the world that India was a nuclear power. Of
course, Pakistan had to respond in kind. What better way to show the military
might of Pakistan than to hold nuclear tests of its own. Sharif was under
pressure domestically and internationally. The US threatened sanctions if
Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, “ the Islamist parties brought
tens of thousands of demonstrators in the streets demanding nuclear tests and
the military weighed in favor of testing…on May 28, 1998, Pakistan tested five
nuclear bombs.’”163 The repercussions of Sharif’s decision were felt immediately
by the middle and affluent members of Pakistan’s population. Husain Haqqani
quotes Sartaj Aziz when describing the financial aftermath of the nuclear tests.
“The night after the nuclear tests, Sharif’s government froze over $11.8
billion in private foreign currency deposits in Pakistani banks. Ordinary
Pakistanis had maintained these deposits to protect themselves from
fluctuations in the value of Pakistani currency and for years the
government had guaranteed that balances in these deposits could be
withdrawn in foreign currency. Successive governments had, however,
used these deposits to finance Pakistan’s trade imbalance and the
banking system would not have been able to cope with demands for hard
currency withdrawals expected after the nuclear tests.”164

This weak economic state concerned the military because their vested
interests were being affected. In October of 1998, army chief General Karamat
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recommended the “creation of a National Security Council, which would
‘institutionalize decision-making…from the military’s point of view, civilian
politicians could hold office only as long as they ensured continuity in policies
preferred by the military and ceded some of their constitutional authority to
technocrats and army generals.”165 Sharif became fed up with General Karamat
and asked him to either resign or to take over the government. Karamat did not
have the personality to take over the government and therefore opted for early
retirement.166 Sharif already had someone in mind to replace Karamat.
Sharif appointed Pervez Musharraf as army chief in October of 1998. He
assumed that as a Mohajir, Musharraf would be unlikely to ever try to take over.
As history has shown, this theory has been proved wrong. Little did Sharif know
that within a year he would be the victim of a coup.
The Kargil Affair exemplifies the military’s audacity to make decisions without
consulting the civilian leader. This incident brought great embarrassment upon
Sharif. The Pakistan military wanted to make a stand in the Kashmir region.
During the spring of 1999, Musharraf ordered his troops to cross the line of
control that divides the Indian and Pakistani armies in Kashmir. The Pakistani
troops made it to one of the most strategic points in Kashmir, the town of Kargil.
They had made “significant territorial gains…Tactically, the operation was a
success, politically, it was a disaster. Sharif found himself in the midst of a major
international crisis. And while General Musharraf had sent the troops in, Prime
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Minister Sharif was left with the unenviable task of getting them out.”167 The
issue of Kashmir has been a thorn on the side of Pakistan since partition.
Because the majority of the Kashmir population is Muslim, the Pakistan
government feels that the region should be aligned with them. When Sharif had
troops pull back from their positions, the Pakistanis were horrified. How dare
Sharif blink first when staring at the Indian Army? Of course, Sharif was trying to
save face in the international arena and he wanted Musharraf to pay for
orchestrating this debacle. Musharraf was also quite upset with Sharif. “By
deciding to pull out of Kargil without negotiating any Indian concessions in
return…Sharif had squandered a militarily advantageous position and caused a
crisis of confidence within the Pakistan army.”168 Thus began the animosity
between these two men. Pervez Musharraf took over Sharif’s government in a
bloodless coup in October 1999.
Asif Ali Zardari - Asif Ali Zardari was born in Karachi, Pakistan on July 26,
1955. His family is of Sindhi background and they lived a comfortable life. His
1987 marriage to Benazir Bhutto was arranged and they have three children.
During her two terms in office as Prime Minister, Zardari served as both the
Federal Environment Minister and the Federal Investment Minister. He earned
the nickname “Mr. 10%” while serving in his wife’s government. This nickname
referred to the amount he would take off the top in business dealings with
companies while he served in government positions; an obvious conflict of
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interest. He was charged and subsequently jailed on charges of corruption
stemming from these actions. Near the end of Benazir’s second term in office
Zardari was charged with the murder of his wife’s brother. He was later cleared
of the murder charges but spent over eleven years in prison.169
He returned to the political stage after his wife’s assassination on December
27, 2007. In her will she had bequeathed the leadership role of the PPP to their
son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. The plan is to allow Asif Ali Zardari to serve as the
temporary chairman of the party until their son completes his education at Oxford
University. In September of 2008 Zardari won the presidential election by the
legislature of Pakistan in a landslide.170 This was despite Zardari’s history of
corruption and unethical behavior. What could explain the legislature’s decision?
Was ten years of military rule wearing them down? Was it the possibility of the
Bhutto name coming back into politics? Zulfikar Bhutto left a legacy that carried
on with his daughter and now his son-in-law. The country was so desperate for a
return to the most inspirational and charismatic civilian leader the country has
ever witnessed; and they are willing to overlook all the ethical problems and
manipulative behavior that Z. Bhutto exhibited.
The strong grip the army has on the civilian governments even when they are
not in direct control is evident in the governments of both Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif. These civilian leaders were constantly trying to appease the
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military and the Islamists while trying to run a country with some semblance of
control. They were naïve to think that their respective governments could get
anything done with the military, ISI and the Islamists watching their every move.
The military was able to easily dismiss these civilian governments with similar
techniques that also disenfranchised the Pakistani population. They became
apathetic to the repeated dismissals and general downward spiral of the country
at the hands of the military and Islamists.
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Conclusions
Pakistan has been on the front lines of terrorist activity in recent years. It is
an ever-changing landscape which involves the military, the Islamists, and the
civilian system. This thesis has attempted to analyze the different roles these
players have played and will play in the future of Pakistani politics. This is
instrumental in understanding the challenges it faces as it tries to move forward
toward a stable government system. The roadblocks ahead are monumental and
the question remains whether this battered nation will be able to pick up the
pieces and become a stable nation free of terrorist activity. Pakistan’s inception
and brief existence has been marred by upheaval punctuated by short periods of
relative calm. It has experienced violent terrorist attacks, more so in recent years,
especially after September 11, 2001. The conflict in the Swat Valley and other
areas of Pakistan exemplify the fact that this nation is the focal point of terrorist
activity and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future.
The absence of civil institutions in Pakistan has allowed the military to easily
infiltrate all aspects of the governmental system. The Islamists have also used
the military’s large role in governmental system to their advantage. They have
their own agenda and use the military establishment to further their goals. Their
interests lie in preserving their distorted version of Islam. The Islamists continue
to create an unstable nation that can be their haven for unrest.
What lies ahead for Pakistan? The success of the military’s current offensive
in Swat Valley could lead Pakistan in a new direction. However, more needs to
be done to successfully change the present conditions in Pakistan. Effective
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civilian institutions must be established for any chance of a better future. The
military and the Islamists must step back from their present roles and allow for
the growth of civil institutions. However, neither one of these groups is willing to
relinquish control nor the financial gains that come with power.
Pakistan needs a leader that can come up from the populace and inspire the
people to demand change. However, the environment is treacherous and
dangerous for anyone willing to fight for transforming Pakistan. Three of the last
four civilian leaders have come from the same family. This practice of nepotism
must end; and so must the presence of patrimonialism. These approaches to
government have been injurious to Pakistan’s progress. It is necessary for
Pakistan to begin to rely upon a system of meritocracy. Will Pakistan be able to
move beyond these entrenched practices and create an environment that would
allow someone to come up from the populace? Pakistan has a long road ahead if
it tries to change the course of its future. If it stays on the current path it will
continue to be an unstable haven for extremists and the military. The status quo
only serves to perpetuate and sustain those that currently hold power and allows
the subjugation of the citizens. If the people of Pakistan demand a just
government that serves its populace, it may require a violent revolution to
overthrow the vested powers that have ruled Pakistan since its inception.
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